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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appel Iants,
vs.
Supreme Court Case No. 46936-2019

MAX E. PEASE,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
BRENT WEDDLE, CHARLES WEDDLE,
and JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District,
in and for the County of Nez Perce

HONORABLE JEFF M. BRUDIE

Robin D. Dunn

John N. Crawford

Attorney of Record

Attorney of Record

Attorney for Appellants

Attorney for Respondent

Rigby, Idaho

Boise, Idaho
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
Dana R McCandless, Mabel Robin Blackeagle
vs.
Max E Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle

§
§
§
§
§

Location: Nez Perce County District
Court
Judicial Officer: Brudie, Jeff M.
Filed on: 06/27/2013
Appellate Case Number: 46936-2019

CASE INFORMATION

Bonds
Transcript Bond
5/6/2019
Counts: 1

Case Type:

$163.80
Posted Cash

A4- Personal Injury or other
claims ($10,000 or More)

Case 04/03/2019 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

Transcript Bond
5/9/2019
4/26/2019
Counts: 1

$729.50
Converted
Posted Cash

Transcript Bond
4/5/2019
Counts: 1

$300.00
Posted Cash

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-2013-1332
Nez Perce County District Court
06/27/2013
Brudie, JeffM.

PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff

Lead Attorneys
Dunn, Robin Dwain
Retained
208-745-9202(W)

Blackeagle, Mabel Robin

Dunn, Robin Dwain
Retained
208-745-9202(W)

McCandless, Dana R

Defendant

DATE

Pease, MaxE

Crawford, John Nick
Retained
208-344-7300(W)

Weddle, Brent

Murphy, Charles Maurice
Retained
208-803-311 0(W)

Weddle, Charles

Murphy, Charles Maurice
Retained
208-803-311 0(W)
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

06/27/2013

Attorney Retained
Plaintiff: McCandless, Dana R Attorney Retained Jonathan D Hally

06/27/2013

Attorney Retained
Plaintiff: Blackeagle, Mabel Robin Attorney Retained Jonathan D Hally
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
06/27/2013

1!:j Complaint Filed
Complaint Filed For Personal Injury And Demand For Jury Trial

06/27/2013

1!j Summons Filed
Summons Filed/Brent Weddle

06/27/2013

1!:J Summons Filed
Summons Filed/Charles Weddle

06/27/2013

Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service/Max Pease

06/27/2013

New Case - Personal Injury

06/27/2013

Miscellaneous
Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-H, or the other A
listings below Paid by: Hally, Jonathan D (attorney for McCandless, Dana R) Receipt
number: 0010446 Dated: 06/28/2013 Amount: $96.00 (Check) For: McCandless, Dana R
(plaintiff)

06/27/2013

1!:j Summons Issued
Summons - Max E. Pease

12/16/2013

1!:J Answer
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial - Defendant Max E. Pease

12/16/2013

Attorney Retained
Defendant: Pease, Max E Attorney Retained J Nick Crawford

12/16/2013

Miscellaneous
Filing: II - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by:
Brassey, Crawford & Howell, PLLC Receipt number: 0019624 Dated: 12/16/2013 Amount:
$66.00 (Check) For: Pease, Max E (defendant)

12/16/2013

1!j Notice of Service

01/15/2014

t:! Notice of Taking Deposition
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Plaintiff Dana R. McCandless~ Defendant Max
E. Pease

01/15/2014

1!j Notice of Taking Deposition
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum ofPlaintiffMabel Robin Blackeagle ~ Defendant
MaxE. Pease

03/14/2014

03/14/2014

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling Conference 03/27/2014 02:30 PM)

t:I Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing- 3-27-14 @2:30PM

03/27/2014

03/27/2014

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Conference scheduled on 03/27/2014 02:30 PM:
Hearing Held
t:l order
Order Setting Case for Trial and Pre-trial Conference
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
03/27/2014

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 04/02/2015 02:00 PM)

03/27/2014

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/13/2015 09:00 AM)

03/27/2014

Telephone Conference (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Conference scheduled on 03/27/2014 02:30 PM:
Hearing Held

10/30/2014

1!j Witness Disclosure
Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures

01/02/2015

tj Witness Disclosure
Defendant Max Pease's Expert Witness Disclosure

01/07/2015

tj Notice of Service
Notice Of Service-defendant Max E. Pease

01/12/2015

t:I Notice
Notice of Substitution ~ Jonathan D. Hally, Blewett Mushlitz for Jonathan D. Hally, Clark and
Feeney

03/ 16/2015

1!j Notice of Taking Deposition
Notice ofDeposition ofMax E. Pease ~ Plaintiffs

03/ 16/2015

tj Notice of Taking Deposition
Amended Notice of Deposition of Max E. Pease~ Plaintiffs

03/ 16/2015

1!j Acknowledgment
Acknowledgment Pursuant to Rule 16(k)(7) IRCP Regarding Case Status/Mediation
(Mediation Unsuccessful~Mediator Charles B. Lempesis)

03/23/2015

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 04/02/2015 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

03/23/2015

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 04/13/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

03/23/2015

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling Conference 04/02/2015 02:00 PM)

03/23/2015

t:! Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Telephonic Scheduling/Status Conference~ 4-2-15 @2:00pm

04/02/2015

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Conference scheduled on 04/02/2015 02:00 PM:
Hearing Held

04/02/2015

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Vacated
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 04/02/2015 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

04/02/2015

Telephone Conference (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Conference scheduled on 04/02/2015 02:00 PM:
Hearing Held
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
04/13/2015

05/04/2015

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Vacated
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 04/13/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

1!j Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service~ Served Brent Weddle: 11-26-13

05/04/2015

1!j Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service~ Served Charles Weddle: 11-26-13

06/02/2015

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling Conference 06/11/2015 02: 15 PM)

06/02/2015

1!:i Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Telephonic Scheduling Conference~ 6-11-15 @2:15pm

06/05/2015

1!:i Answer
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial

06/05/2015

Attorney Retained
Defendant: Weddle, Brent Attorney Retained Charles M Murphy

06/05/2015

Attorney Retained
Defendant: Weddle, Charles Attorney Retained Charles M Murphy

06/05/2015

Miscellaneous
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Geico
Indemnity Co Receipt number: 0008920 Dated: 6/5/2015 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For:
Weddle, Brent (defendant) and Weddle, Charles (defendant)

06/11/2015

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Conference scheduled on 06/11/2015 02:15 PM:
Hearing Held

06/11/2015

Telephone Conference (2:15 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Conference scheduled on 06/11/2015 02:15 PM:
Hearing Held

06/15/2015

1!:i order
Order Setting Case for Trial and Pre-Trial Conference

06/15/2015

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 07/07/2016 02:00 PM)

06/15/2015

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/19/2016 09:00 AM)

06/19/2015

t!:1 Notice
Notice of Change ofAddress~ The Law Firm ofBrassey Crawford PLLC

02/01/2016

1!j Witness Disclosure
Defendant Max Pease's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure

02/01/2016

1!J Witness Disclosure
Defendants Weddle's Expert Witness Disclosure
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
04/28/2016

t:! Notice of Taking Deposition
Notice Of Deposition of Brent Weddle~ Plaintiff

06/29/2016

1!j Notice of Taking Deposition
Notice Of Taking Trial Deposition Testimony ofAnne McCormack MD~ Defendant Max E.
Pease

07/01/2016

r:I Notice
Notice of Vacating Trial Deposition Testimony ofAnne McCormack MD~ Defendant Pease

07/01/2016

r:l Statement
Defendants Wedd/e's Pre-trial Statement

07/01/2016

1!j Witness Disclosure
Defendants Brent Weddle and Charles Wedd/e's Trial Witness Disclosure

07/07/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 07/07/2016 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

07/07/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/19/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

07/07/2016

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Vacated
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 07/07/2016 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

07/19/2016

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Vacated
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/19/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

10/18/2016

Attorney Retained
Plaintiff: McCandless, Dana R Attorney Retained Robin D Dunn

10/18/2016

Attorney Retained
Plaintiff: Blackeagle, Mabel Robin Attorney Retained Robin D Dunn

10/18/2016

1!j Substitution of Counsel
Robin D. Dunn for Jonathan D. Hally for Plaintiffs

10/18/2016

1!:! Request
Request for Trial Setting~ Plaintiffs

10/26/2016

1!j Response
Response to Request for Trial Setting ~ Defendant Max E. Pease

11/02/2016

1!j Response
Response to Request for Trial Setting~ Defendants Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle

12/12/2016

t!:I Motion
Motion to Enforce Settlement~ Defendant Max E. Pease

12/12/2016

tj Affidavit
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement

12/12/2016
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332

1!j Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Enforce Settlement
12/15/2016

12/15/2016

12/27/2016

1!:i Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing~ 1-12-17@9:00am
Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement
by Telephone
Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 01/12/2017 09:00 AM) TELE~ Defendant's Motion to Enforce
Settlement

1!j Affidavit
Affidavit of Charles M Murphy in Support of Defendants' Weddle Joinder of Motion to
Enforce Settlement

12/27/2016

-r!j Motion
Joinder of Defendant Pease's Motion to Enforce Settlement~ Defendants Brent Weddle and
Charles Weddle

01/12/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 01/12/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing Held TELE~
Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement

01/12/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 01/12/2017 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 pages TELE~
Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement

01/12/2017

Case Taken Under Advisement
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 01/12/2017 09:00 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement TELE~ Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement

01/12/2017

1!j Minute Entry
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement
Hearing date: 1/12/2017
Time: 9:05 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: PAM
Tape Number: Crtrm #1
Plaintiff: Robin Dunn
Defendant Pease: Ryan Janis

01/12/2017

Hearing Scheduled (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
TELE~ Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
01/12/2017 09:00AM: Hearing Held

01/19/2017

1!:i order
Order on Motion to Enforce Settlement (Granted)

01/20/2017

1!:I Notice
Notice and Claim ofAttorney Lien ~ Plaintiffs

01/26/2017

1!:i Request
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
Request for Reconsideration ~ Plaintiffs
01/27/2017

1!j Declaration
Declaration of Dana McCandless

01/27/2017

1!j Declaration
Declaration of Robin Blackeagle

01/31/2017

1!:! Request
Request for Reconsideration: Points to Consider

01/31/2017

1!j Declaration
Declaration of Robin D. Dunn Esq

02/02/2017

t:! Notice
Notice ofDefendants' Intent to File Response

03/06/2017

1!:i order
Order~ (Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration to be filed by 3-1517)

03/09/2017

1!j Affidavit
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plalintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration

03/09/2017

1!j Response
Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration ~ Defendant Max E. Pease

03/16/2017

1!j Response
Joinder of Defendant Pease's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration
~ Defendants Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle

05/01/2017

1!::! Notice
Notice of Telephonic Hearing on Motion to Reconsider~ 5-24-17@ 1:00 PST

05/01/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 05/24/2017 01:00 PM) Telephone~ Plaintiffs Motion to
Reconsider

05/24/2017

Motion Granted
Motion Granted~ (Hearing 05/24/2017 01:00 PM) Telephone~ Plaintiffs Motion to
Reconsider

05/24/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Linda Carlton
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 pages

05/24/2017

1!j Minute Entry
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider
Hearing date: 5/30/2017
Time: 1:07 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Linda Carlton
Minutes Clerk: PAM
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
Tape Number: Crtrm #1
Plaintiffs: Robin D. Dunn
Defendant Max E. Pease: Ryan Janis
Defendants Brent Weddle & Charles Weddle: Charles M Murphy
05/24/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2017 OJ :00 PM: Hearing Held Telephone~
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider

05/24/2017

Motion Granted
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2017 01:00 PM: Motion Granted Telephone~
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider

05/24/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2017 OJ :00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Linda Carlton
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 pages Telephone ~
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider

05/24/2017

Hearing Scheduled (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Telephone~ Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
05/24/2017 01:00 PM: Hearing Held

05/26/2017

06/08/2017

1!:l order
Order on Motion to Reconsider

1!:I Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling Conference 06/22/2017 01:00 PM)

06/08/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Telephonic Scheduling Conference~ 6-22-17@ 1:00pm

06/22/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Conference scheduled on 06/22/2017 01:00 PM:
Hearing Held

06/22/2017

r:1 order
Order Setting Case for Trial and Pre-Trial Conference

06/22/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 03/15/2018 02:00 PM)

06/22/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/26/2018 09:00 AM)

06/22/2017

Telephone Conference (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Conference scheduled on 06/22/2017 01:00 PM:
Hearing Held

01/29/2018

1!j Witness Disclosure
Defendant's Second Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure

03/ 12/2018

1!j Witness Disclosure
Defendants Brent Weddle and Charles Wedd/e's Second Trial Witness Disclosure

03/22/2018

1!:l order
Order Setting Case for Trial and Pre-Trial Conference
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
03/22/2018

Continued
Continued (Jury Trial 12/17/2018 09: 00 AM)

03/22/2018

Continued
Continued (Pretrial Conference 12/06/2018 02:00 PM)

04/02/2018

1!:I Notice
Notice of Change ofAddress

12/05/2018

1!j Miscellaneous
Pre-trial Conference Compliance with Orders

12/05/2018

1!j Witness and Exhibit List
Defendant's Witness and Exhibit Lists

12/05/2018

1!j Defendants Requested Jury Instructions
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions

12/06/2018

t:! Pre-trial Conference (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM. ;Location: In Chambers)

12/06/2018

t!J Statement
Defendants' Concise Statement of Defenses

12/06/2018

'l!j Defendants Requested Jury Instructions
Defendants Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle's Requested Jury Instructions

12/06/2018

1!j Statement
Defendants Weddles' Concise Statement ofDefenses

12/06/2018

1!j Court Minutes

12/10/2018

1!j Motion
Defendant's Motion in Limine

12/10/2018

tj Memorandum In Support of Motion
in Limine

12/10/2018

~

12/11/2018

~ Stipulation to Dismiss

Affidavit
of Counsel in Support ofDefendant's Motion in Limine

with Prejudice as to Defendants Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle Only
12/11/2018

tJ order
to Dismiss Defendants Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle Only

12/11/2018

r:l Response
to Motion in Limine - McCandless

12/11/2018

1!j Declaration
to Motion In Limine by Robin Dunn
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
12/11/2018

1!j Memorandum
on Motion In Limine - McCandless

12/12/2018

Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Comment()
Party (Weddle, Brent; Weddle, Charles)
dismissal as to Brent and Charles Weddle only

12/17/2018

Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM. ;Location: Courtroom 1)

12/17/2018

Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM. ;Location: Courtroom 1)

12/17/2018

1!l Court Minutes
Part 1 of 12/17/18 minutes

12/17/2018

't::j Court Minutes
Part 2 of 12/17/18 minutes

12/18/2018
12/18/2018

Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM. ;Location: Courtroom 1)

1!j Defendants Requested Jury Instructions
Defendants' Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions

12/18/2018

1!l Court Minutes
Jury Trial - Day 2

12/19/2018

1!1 Jury Trial (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM. ;Location: Courtroom 1)

12/19/2018

1!j Verdict form

12/19/2018

~ Court Minutes
Jury Trial - Day 3

12/19/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Linda Carlton - 425 pages

12/20/2018

1::1 Jury Instructions Filed

01/02/2019

1::I Motion
for New Trial

01/02/2019

1!j Affidavit
of Counsel

01/02/2019

1::1 Memorandum In Support of Motion
of the PlaintiffIn Support of New Trial

01/04/2019
01/04/2019
01/16/2019

1!j Judgment
Civil Disposition Entered
1!:J Response
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial

01/18/2019

t:! Motion
Defendant's Motion for Costs

01/18/2019

1!j Memorandum of Costs
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs

01/18/2019

1!j Affidavit
Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMotion for Costs

01/18/2019

1!:I Motion
Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

01/18/2019

1!j Memorandum In Support of Motion
Defendant's Memorandum in Support Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

01/18/2019

1!j Affidavit
Affidavit of Bill Paseman in Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment

01/24/2019

~

01/24/2019

1!J Objection

Notice of Hearing
Notice of Telephonic Hearing

to Costs Filed By The Defendant

01/24/2019

~ Declaration
on Objection

01/24/2019

r:J Objection
to Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

02/04/2019

r:! Reply
Brief in Support ofDefendants Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment

02/04/2019

L!;J Reply
Brief in Support of Motion for Costs

02/08/2019

t:! Motion Hearing (10 :00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM. ;Location: Courtroom 1)
Def Mtn to Alter or Amend Judgment

02/08/2019

1!j Court Minutes

03/27/2019

1!:i order
Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial

04/01/2019

~

04/03/2019

1!J Notice of Appeal

Notice
ofAcceptance ofAdditur
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
04/03/2019
04/05/2019

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
t:! Judgment
Amended

04/05/2019

Bond Posted - Cash

04/08/2019

Amended Final Judgment (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM.)
Comment()
Party (McCandless, Dana R; Blackeagle, Mabel Robin; Pease, Max E)
Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: McCandless, Dana R; Blackeagle, Mabel Robin; Pease, Max E
Against: McCandless, Dana R; Blackeagle, Mabel Robin; Pease, Max E
Entered Date: 01/04/2019
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 01/04/2019
Monetary Award:
Amount: $18,825.00
Comment: $27,450.00 original amount

04/15/2019

1!j Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal

04/ 16/2019

1!:J order
Second Amended Judgment

04/ 16/2019

1!j Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Order Withdrawing Conditional Dismissal

04/ 18/2019
04/26/2019
04/29/2019

05/06/2019
05/09/2019
05/09/2019

1!:! Amended Notice of Appeal

Bond Posted - Cash
1!:! Request
for Additional Transcript and Record

Bond Posted - Cash
~

Reporter's Notice ofTranscript(s) Lodged

Bond Converted

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Pease, Max E
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 5/21/2019

66.00
66.00
0.00

Defendant Weddle, Brent
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 5/21/2019

136.00
136.00
0.00

Defendant Weddle, Charles
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 5/21/2019

0.00
0.00
0.00
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-1332
Plaintiff McCandless, Dana R
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 5/21/2019

245.00
245.00
0.00

Attorney of Record Crawford, John Nick
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/21/2019

82.55

Plaintiff McCandless, Dana R
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/21/2019

87.00

Plaintiff McCandless, Dana R
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/21/2019

0.00
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1

2
3
4

5

JONATHAN D. HALLY
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP
Idaho State Bar No. 4979
1229 Main Street
PO Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9516
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

6
7
8

9

10
11

12

13
14

15
16
17
18

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DANA R. McCANDLESS and MABEL ROBIN)
)
BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife,
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES 1-5, )
)
Defendants.
)
)

Case No.

CV 1 3 • 0 1 3 3 2

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL
INJURY AND DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL
Fee Category: A{l)
Fee: $96.00

COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiffs and for a cause of action against the Defendants
allege as follows:
1.

That based upon information and belief, Defendant, MAX E. PEASE, was a resident

19
of Idaho County, Idaho, at the time of the incident described herein, but whose current residency is
20
21
22
23

unknown.

2.

The County of residence for Defendants, BRENT WEDDLE and CHARLES

WEDDLE is currently unknown.

24

25
26

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURY
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AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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1
2
3

4

3.

The true names of Defendants identified as John Does 1-5 are unknown at this time,

but will be named specifically when said names become known.

4.

Plaintiffs suffered personal injuries in a motor vehicle collision that occurred on June

30, 2011 on U.S. Highway 12, in Idaho County, Idaho as more fully described below.

5

5.

At the time of the collision, Defendant, MAX PEASE, was the actual and registered

6
7

owner of a 2011 Chevrolet Silverado which vehicle was involved in the collision. Furthermore,

8

Defendant, MAX PEASE, was operating the Chevrolet Silverado at the time of the auto incident

9

complained of herein.

10

11

6.

At the time of the collision, Defendant, BRENT WEDDLE was operating a 1989

Toyota Pickup which vehicle was involved in the collision. On information and belief, Defendant

12

CHARLES D. WEDDLE was the actual and registered owner of the above-mentioned 1989 Toyota
13
14
15

16
17
18

Pickup and did give permission to BRENT WEDDLE to drive said vehicle. Defendant CHARLES
D. WEDDLE is being named as a defendant solely based upon his ownership of the Toyota Pickup.

7.

On June 30, 2011, at the time of the collision, Plaintiff, DANA MCCANDLESS, was

operating a 2005 Dodge Pickup and was traveling eastbound on Highway 12 near mile post 69
within Idaho County, Idaho. Plaintiff MABLE BLACK.EAGLE was the registered owner of, and

19
a passenger in, said vehicle.
20
21

8.

While Defendant MCCANDLESS, was approaching mile post 69, Defendant BRENT

22

WEDDLE was traveling westbound on Highway 12 and did slow down and/or stop the 1989 Toyota

23

Pickup in the westbound lane of travel near milepost 69, ostensibly for the purpose making a left-

24
25
26

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURY
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1

hand turn. At the same time, Defendant PEASE was also traveling westbound on Highway 12,

2

directly behind Defendant BRENT WEDDLE, and did fail to yield and/or stop and did crash his

3

2011 Silverado truck into Defendant WEDDLE'S vehicle.

As a result, Defendant WEDDLE's

4

vehicle crossed over into the eastbound lane of travel and did strike the vehicle driven by Plaintiff
5
6

7

8
9

10

MCCANDLESS, thereby injuring both Plaintiffs and causing damage to Plaintiff BLACK.EAGLE'S
vehicle.
9.

The aforesaid acts, actions, and/or omissions performed or exhibited by or on the part

of Defendant, MAX PEASE, constituted negligence and negligence per se.

10.

The negligence of the Defendant, MAX PEASE, included, but was not necessarily

11

limited to, the following:
12
13
14

a.

Failing to keep a proper lookout;

b.

Driving a motor vehicle in a reckless and/or inattentive manner in violation

15

16
17

of Idaho Code § 49-1401 ;
C.

Failure to slow, stop and/or avoid collision with Weddle's vehicle;

d.

Failure to exercise due care and caution in the operation of a motor vehicle

18

in violation ofldaho Code§ 49-615;

19
20
21

e.

Traveling too fast for conditions,

f.

Operating a vehicle in a reckless, negligent and dangerous fashion in

22
23

24
25
26

violation ofldaho Code§ 49-1401

g.

Operating a vehicle in disregard of the safety of persons or property in
violation of Idaho Code § 49-1401;

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURY
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
- 3
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1

2
3

11.

The aforesaid acts, actions, and/or omissions performed or exhibited by or on the part

of Defendant, BRENT WEDDLE constituted negligence and/or negligence per se.

4

12.

Plaintiffs injuries and damages were directly, foreseeably, and proximately caused

5

by the negligence and unlawful actions of Defendant, MAX PEASE and/or BRENT WEDDLE,
6
7

8
9

10

herein before described.
13.

That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's, MAX PEASE and/or Defendant

BRENT WEDDLE'S negligence hereinbefore described, Plaintiffs have been caused to suffer
damages for personal injury in an amount to be established at trial but which amount exceeds the

11

jurisdictional limits of the Magistrate's division for each Plaintiff. Such damages include, but are
12

13

not limited to: past, present, and future medical expenses, pain and suffering, physical impairment,

14

mental anguish, loss of enjoyment oflife, temporary and/or permanent bodily injury and disability,

15

and loss of income.

16

14.

17

That in order to recover damages referred to above, it has been necessary for Plaintiff

to employ Jonathan D. Hally of the law firm of Clark and Feeney, LLP, Lewiston, Idaho, to

18
represent her in this action. The Defendant should be ordered to pay unto Plaintiff an amount as and

19
20

for reasonable attorney fees as the Court deems just and for costs necessarily incurred in prosecuting

21

this action.

22

15.

23

The amount in controversy for each Plaintiff exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the

Magistrate's Division.

24

25
26
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1

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows:

2

1.

3

For actual damages, including past, present, and future medical expenses, and loss
ofincome in an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Division, the

4

exact amount of which will be established at trial;

5

2.

For damages against Defendants for temporary and/or permanent bodily injury and

6

disability in an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Division, the

7

exact amount of which will be established at trial;

8
9

3.

10

For damages against Defendants for past, present, and future pain and suffering in
an amount to be established at trial;

11

4.

For damages to Plaintiffs' property in an amount to be established at trial;

4.

For Plaintiffs costs and attorney fees necessarily incurred herein; and

5.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

12
13
14
15

16

DATED this 2'fitay of June, 2013.
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP

17
18

19

an D. Hally, a ember of the firm
ttomeys for Plaintiff

20
21

22
23
24
25
26
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1
2
3

Plaintiffs demand a jury trial of all issues in this cause and will not stipulate to a jury of less
than twelve.

4

DATED on this

21

t\,

day of June, 2013.

5

CLARK and FEENEY, LLP
6
7

,
ys or Plaintiff

8

fthe firm

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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ORIGl'NAL
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J. Nick Crawford, ISB 3220
BRASSEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone (208) 344-7300
Facsimtle (208) 344-7077

2013 DEC 16 AM 9 39
PATTY O ~K~,.L-

C~~ W\~
IE,-tHY

Attorneys for Defendant Max E. Pease

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DANA R. McCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 13-01332
Plaintiffs,

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL

vs
MAX E PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES
1-5,

Fee· $66 00
Category I (l)(a)

Defendants.

COMES NOW the above-captioned Defendant Max E. Pease, by and through counsel of
record, J Nick Crawford of the firm Brassey, Crawford & Howell, and answer Plaintiffs' Complaint
as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim against this answering Defendant upon which relief
can be granted

Page 21

SECOND DEFENSE

I.
Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not herein expressly and
specifically admitted.
II.

Regarding paragraph 1, Defendant Pease is currently a resident of Lewis County, Idaho.
Defendant lacks sufficient information to respond to paragraphs 2, 6, and 11, and therefore denies
the same. No response to paragraph 3 is required. Defendant admits that Plaintiff was involved in
a motor vehicle collision on June 30, 2011 on Highway 12 in Idaho County, but lacks sufficient
information regarding Plaintiffs injuries and therefore denies the remaining allegations contained
in paragraph 4. Defendant admits paragraphs 5 and 7. Defendant admits that he was traveling west
on Highway 12 at the time of the motor vehicle collision, but denies the remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 8. Defendant denies paragraphs 9, 10 and 12-14. Defendant admits that
jurisdiction is proper in this court, and denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 15.
THIRD DEFENSE

PlaintiffDana McCandless was guilty of negligent and careless misconduct at the time of and
in connection with the matters and damages alleged, which conduct on her part proximately caused
and contributed to said events and resultant damages, if any.
FOURTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs are not the real party in interest with respect to all or a part of their claim, contrary
to Rule 17, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR illRY TRIAL
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FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs are barred from recovery in whole or in part for failure to mitigate damages.

SIXTH DEFENSE
There exists no proximate causation and/or causation between any alleged act or alleged
breach of duty or warranty by this answering Defendant and all or some Plaintiffs' alleged damages.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
To the extent that Plaintiffs have been compensated by collateral sources as provided for in
LC. § 6-1606, any award issued in this case should be reduced by the same.

EIGHTH DEFENSE
To the extent there was any prepayment of claims as provided for in LC. § 41-1840, this
answering Defendant is entitled to credit for the same.

NINTH DEFENSE
This answering Defendant alleges the affirmative defense of comparative negligence as and
against any and all other parties to this action. The negligence, if any, of this answering Defendant
is to be compared and reduced accordingly relative to any negligence committed by any other person,
entity, or party to this action.

TENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' damages, if any, were proximately caused by the superceding, intervening
negligence or actions of other third persons, including other defendants to this matter, and any
negligence or breach of duty on the part of this answering Defendant, if any, was not a proximate
cause of the alleged loss to Plaintiff. In asserting this defense, this answering Defendant does not
admit any negligence, and to the contrary, denies all allegations or other blameworthy conduct.

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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WHEREFORE, this answering Defendant prays that Plaintifftake nothing by this Complaint,
that the Complaint herein be dismissed, and that Defendant be awarded his costs of suit, reasonable
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54,
and such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

DEFENDANT DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY AS TO ALL ISSUES
DATED this

l ):f'aay of December, 2013.
BRASSEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC

By_.,___----+...,___~ :1,,,,LJ1.+-=-',L...---- -----J.
A
efendant Max E. Pease

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ) ~ y of December, 2013, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL upon each of the following
individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses indicated below:
Jonathan D. Hally
Clark and Feeney
1229 Main Street
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

_X__

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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F'Al1 i 0.
CLERK OF THE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JU CIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL
)
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
)
V.
)
)
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
)
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES
1-5
)
)
)
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 13-01332
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

__,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named case be set

forJve1

trial

before the Honorable JEFF M. BRUDIE, District Judge, at the Nez Perce County Courthouse, at
Lewiston, Idaho, at the hour of9:00 a.m. on the L1. day of .Jt£1l,

. ~O/b,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following:

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR

TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE
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disclosure of Plaintiffs expert witnesses, including compliance with IRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(l ), shall be on or before

1,6.~o✓

disclosure of Defendants' expert witnesses, including compliance with IRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(l ), shall be on or before

/

z./J
I /41/
( I
I

any summary judgment motions must be scheduled and heard by_ _ _ _ _ __
all discovery shall be completed by

3/w/4 /5'

that a pre-trial conference shall be held::

'.;/4..~/5
~I

at the hour of 2:00

p.m. Lead counsel trying the case must be personally present at the pretrial conference. Counsel are
to notify the Court if they wish the pre-trial conference to be telephonic.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party
shall:
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pretrial hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses
asserted by that party;
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial
conference to be marked;
3) Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared
to submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing;
4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibit or to make
specific objections to its admissibility;
5) Furnish opposing counsel with names and addresses of all
witnesses, the nature of their testimony, experts' reports, and like
instruments, and complete all other matters which may expedite both
the pre-trial and the trial of this case;
6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement;

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

2
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7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions of law
relied upon;
8) Submit to the court arid counsel a copy of all jury instructions
counsel intends to request at least seven (7) days before the scheduled
trial date. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies, each
containing citations of authority. The Court uses the following
instructions from IDJI2d and it is not necessary for counsel to submit
them: 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1, 1.11, 1.13, 1.15.2, 1.20.1, and 9.00.
DATEDthis

-4-

dayofMarch2014.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING FOR TRIAL AND
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE was:

S'7

_ _ hand delivered via court basket, or

✓

mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2014, to:

3 Jday of March

Jonathan D. Hally
PO Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501

J. Nick Crawford
'rVf,d..J.
PO Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009

0

R SETTING CASE FOR
RIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE
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ZD15 JUN 5
LAW OFFICE OF CHARLES M. MURPHY
Charles M. Murphy, ISB #4991
950 W. Bannock St.
Suite 1100
Boise, ID 83 702-6140
Telephone: (208) 319-3623
Facsimile: (208) 319-3823
Attorneys for Defendants,
Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DANA R. MCCANDLESS AND MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, HUSBAND AND
WIFE,

Case No. CV-13-1332

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Fee Category: 1.1.

MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, AND JOHN DOES 15,

Fee: $136.00

Defendants.

Defendants, BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE, as and for an Answer to
Plaintiffs' Complaint, plead and allege as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
These Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint, unless
expressly hereinafter admitted.

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
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1.

With regard to Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants admit each

and every allegation contained therein
2.

With regard to Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants deny each and

every allegation contained therein.
3.

With regard to Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiffs have failed to assert

factual allegations which require an Answer, but, to the extent that factual allegations are contained
therein, these Defendants deny the same.
4.

With regard to Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants are without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained
therein, and therefore deny the same.
5.

With regard to Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, only allegations relating to

Defendant Max E. Pease are contained therein, which do not require an Answer by these
Defendants. However, to the extent that there are any factual allegations contained therein relating
to Defendants Weddle, these Defendants deny each and every allegation contained therein.
6.

With regard to Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants are without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as the truth of the allegations relating to
Defendant Charles Weddle contained therein. With regard to the remaining allegations found in
Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants admit the remaining allegations contained
therein.
7.

With regard to Paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants admit each

and every allegation contained therein.
8.

With regard to Paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants admit that

collisions occurred between the respective vehicles operated by the parties to this case as described

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
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therein. With regard to the remaining allegations found in Paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint,
these Defendants deny all remaining allegations contained therein.
9.

With regard to Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, only allegations

relating to Defendant Max E. Pease are contained therein, which do not require an Answer by these
Defendants. However, to the extent that there are any factual allegations contained therein relating
to Defendants Weddle, these Defendants deny each and every allegation contained therein.
10.

With regard to Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants deny each

and every allegation contained therein.
11.

With regard to Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants deny each

and every allegation contained therein as it relates to Defendant Brent Weddle.
12.

With regard to Paragraphs 13 and 14 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants

deny each and every allegation contained therein.
13.

With regard to Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Defendants admit that

Plaintiffs have alleged damages in this case in excess of the jurisdictional threshold of this court.
SECOND DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused by the negligence of
Plaintiff Dana R. McCandless, whose negligence was at least equal to or greater in degree than any
negligence on the part of Defendant Brent C. Weddle. In asserting this defense, these Defendants
do not admit any negligence on their behalf, but, to the contrary, specifically deny all such
allegations.
THIRD DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, if any, were solely and proximately caused by the
negligence of Defendant Max E. Pease.

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their damages, if any.

FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs are not the real party in interest pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 17, with regard to all or a portion of the damages alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint.

SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, if any, were caused by the negligence of third persons not
parties to this action.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, if any, were caused by the superseding, intervening acts
and/or negligence of third persons not parties to this action.

WHERFORE, these Defendants pray for Judgment against Plaintiffs as follows:
a.

That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiffs take

nothing thereunder;
b.

That these Defendants be awarded attorney's fees incurred in defending this action,

pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121;
c.

That these Defendants be awarded costs and disbursements necessarily incurred in

defending this action pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54; and
d.

For such other and further relief as this court deems just and proper.

I
I
II

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
These Defendants hereby demand a jury trial pursuant to the provisions Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 38(b).

DATED this

r!

day of _ _ _ _ _

~

2015.

LAW OFFICE OF CHARLES M. MURPHY

Charles M. Murphy
Attorney for Defendants,
Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle
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~

I hereby certify that on the
day of
n/v
, 2015, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be forw ded in the manner indicated below to the
following person(s):

Jonathan D. Hally
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP
301 D. St. Ste. C
P.O. Box 1990
Lewiston, ID 83501

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 413-6682

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission

arles M. Murphy
Attorney for Defendants
Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECO
ICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL
)
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
V.
)
)
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
)
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES )
1-5
)
)
)
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 13-01332
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named case be set for Jury trial before the
Honorable JEFF M. BRUDIE, District Judge, at the Nez Perce County Courthouse, at Lewiston,
Idaho, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on the 19th day of July 2016.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following:
disclosure of Plaintiffs expert witnesses, including compliance with IRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(l), shall be on or before November 30, 2015;

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE
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disclosure of Defendants' expert witnesses, including compliance with IRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(l), shall be on or before January 29, 2016;
any summary judgment motions must be scheduled and heard by__,,.,__d__Y,...a....._ _

l
all discovery shall be completed by July 1, 2016;
that a pre-trial conference shall be held on July 7, 2016 at the hour of 2:00 p.m.
Lead counsel trying the case must be personally present at the pretrial conference. Counsel are to
notify the Court if they wish the pre-trial conference to be telephonic.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party
shall:
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pretrial hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses
asserted by that party;
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial
conference to be marked;
3) Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared
to submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing;
4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibit or to make
specific objections to its admissibility;
5) Furnish opposing counsel with names and addresses of all
witnesses, the nature of their testimony, experts' reports, and like
instruments, and complete all other matters which may expedite both
the pre-trial and the trial of this case;
6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement;
7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions of law
relied upon;

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE
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8) Submit to the court and counsel a copy of all jury instructions
counsel intends to request at least seven (7) days before the scheduled
trial date. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies, each
containing citations of authority. The Court uses the following
instructions from IDJI2d and it is not necessary for counsel to submit
them: 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1, 1.11, 1.13, 1.15.2, 1.20.1, and 9.00.
DATED this

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

r/ ...')

day of June 2015.

3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING FOR TRIAL AND
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE was:
~

_ _ hand delivered via court basket, or

✓

mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this /
2015, to:

5 day of June

Jonathan D. Hally
Blewett Mushlitz, LLP
PO Box 1990
Lewiston, ID 83501
J. Nick Crawford
PO Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009

___

Charles M. Murphy
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 1100,_
Boise, ID 83 702-6140

By-.1/~
• eputy

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE
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COURT MINUTES
CV-2013-0001332
Dana R McCandless, etal. vs. Max E Pease, etal.
Hearing type: Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement
Hearing date: 1/12/2017
Time: 9:05 am
Judge: Jeff M. Brudie
Courtroom: 1
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: PAM
Tape Number: Crtrm #1
Plaintiff: Robin Dunn
Defendant Pease: Ryan Janis

9:05:11
Mr. Dunn is present on the telephone for Plaintiffs. Mr. Janis is present on the
telephone for Defendant Pease. Mr. Murphy is not present. Court tried calling his cell phone
number which was provided to the clerk and Mr. Murphy did not answer. Court just got
voice mail.
9:05:13
Court reviews Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement. Court is ready to
proceed with argument.
Mr. Janis presents Defendant Pease's argument. Plaintiffs agreed to
9:06:18
settlement. He will rely on brief for argument
9:07:17
Mr. Dunn responds and presents Plaintiffs' argument There was never a
meeting of the minds between Plaintiff and his attorney. The affidavits are hearsay. There
was a considerable breakdown between Plaintiffs' attorney and his clients. Plaintiff Mr.
Candless contacted him and asked that the case be set for trial. There was no agreement
and no signed agreement. All the affidavits are complete hearsay between two attorneys.
To enforce an agreement that is not agreed upon would be unconscionable. There was no
meeting of the minds.
9:11:01

Court questions Mr. Janis if he would like to respond to Plaintiffs' argument?

9:11:19
Mr. Janis responds and presents Defendant Pease's argument. An agreement
was reached. It is a binding contract. Defense Counsel sent checks to Mr. Hally and Plaintiffs
were supposed to sign releases and Stipulation to Dismiss the case. Plaintiffs have filed
nothing in opposition.

Court Minutes
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9:12:43
Court resp011us. Court wants to review case furthe •. "'ourt will take Motion to
Enforce Settlement under advisement. Court will issue a written ruling.
9:12:52

Court in recess.

PAM!LA SCHNEIDl!II

U-t{u-i;,

Court Minutes
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDieiiff
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO

DANA R. MCCANDLESS AND,
MABEL ROBIN BLACKEAGLE,
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
Plaintiffs,

v.
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, AND JOHN
DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

,,

ORDER ON MOTION TO
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to enforce settlement. A hearing
on this matter was held on January 12, 2017. Plaintiffs were represented by Robin Dunn.
Defendant Pease was represented by Ryan Janis. Counsel for Defendants Brent and Charles
Weedle did not appear. The Court, having considered the motion, memorandum, and affidavits
submitted by the parties, the applicable law, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders
its decision.
This action arose as a personal injury claim against the Defendants as a result of a motor
vehicle collision on Highway 12 on June 30, 2011. The Defendant's assert that the parties
1
reached a settlement agreement in this case prior to the Plaintiffs' substitution of counsel. They

1

The Plaintiffs originally retained Jonathan Hally as counsel, however they substituted Robin Dunn as counsel on
October 18, 2016.

1
McCandless, eta/. v. Pease, eta!.
Order on Motion to Enforce Settlement
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now seek to have that agreement enforced. The Defendants request that the Plaintiffs be ordered
to sign the release and indemnity agreements and to stipulate to dismissal of the lawsuit with
prejudice. 2
A motion for the enforcement of a settlement agreement is treated as a motion for
summary judgment when no evidentiary hearing has been conducted." Estate ofHolland v.

Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94,100,279 P.3d 80, 86 (2012). Summary judgment is
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "When applying this standard, this
Court construes disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Holdaway v.

Broulim's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606,349 P.3d 1197, 1201 (2015). "[T]he nonmoving party
must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists." Id.
Moreover, a mere scintilla of evidence or merely casting a slight doubt of the facts will not
defeat summary judgment. Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237,241,280 P.3d 740, 744 (2012). In
other words, to create a genuine issue, there must be evidence upon which a jury may rely. Id.
A settlement agreement stands on the same footing as any other contract and is
governed by the same rules and principles as are applicable to contracts generally.
A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or
contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty.
Whether the parties to an oral agreement or stipulation become bound prior to the
drafting and execution of a contemplated formal writing is largely a question of
intent. Generally the determination of the existence of a sufficient meeting of the
minds to form a contract is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of facts.

Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664,672,249 P.3d 857,865 (2011).

2

Motion to Enforce Settlement; Joinder ofDefendant Pease 's Motion to Enforce Settlement.

2
McCandless, eta/. v. Pease, eta/.
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In support of their motion the Defendants have submitted numerous copies of
correspondence detailing the settlement discussions between Hally and the Defendants' counsel
as well as release and indemnity agreements purportedly revised and approved by the Plaintiffs.3
Further, the Weddles submitted copies of checks generated for the Plaintiffs in the amount
4
agreed upon in the settlement. Defendant Pease asserts that two checks totaling $45,000 were

5
sent to the Plaintiffs per their agreement. In opposition to the motion, The Plaintiffs have not

submitted any evidence or affidavits contesting the Defendants' assertions that a settlement had
been reached. Therefore, upon the record before the Court, the Plaintiffs fail to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether a valid settlement agreement was formed. Accordingly, the
Defendants' motion is granted.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' motion to enforce settlement is
GRANTED.

Dated this

-1./--

day of January 2017.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofmotion to enforce settlement, Exhibit A, B, C; Affidavit of Charles M Murphy in
Support ofDefendants ' Weddle Joinder ofmotion to enforce settlement, Exhibit A, B, C.
4
Affidavit of Charles M Murphy, Exhibit D.
5
Affidavit of Counsel, at 3.
3

3
McCandless, eta/. v. Pease, eta/.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO ENFORCE
SETTLEMENT was:

q,,}

_ _ hand delivered via court basket, or

~ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this J9day of January
2017, to:

Robin D. Dunn
POBox277
Rigby,ID 83442

J. Nick Crawford
Ryan C. Janis
PO Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009

Charles M. Murphy
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 1100
Boise, ID 83 702-6140

CJaJtd
Deputy

4
McCandless, etal v. Pease, etal.
Order on Motion to Enforce Settlement
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDIC
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO

DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and
wife,
Plaintiffs

Vs.

MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES
1-5,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2013-001332

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Request for
Reconsideration filed on January 26, 2017 is to be filed by March 15, 2017.

DATED this _f_ day of March, 2017.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

ORDER

1
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.

r

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER was

__✓_ hand delivered via court basket, or

6

✓

_ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
to:

q¼

/_p day of March 2017,

J. Nick Crawford
Ryan C. Janis
Fax: (208) 344-7077

Robin D. Dunn
Fax: (208) 745-8160

Charles M. Murphy
Fax: (208) 319-3823

ORDER

2
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COURT MINUTES
CV-2013-0001332
Dana R McCandless, etal. vs. Max E Pease, etal.
Hearing type: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider
Hearing date: 5/24/2017
Time: 1:07 pm
Judge: Jeff M. Brudie
Courtroom: 1
Court reporter: Linda Carlton
Minutes Clerk: PAM
Tape Number: Crtrm #1
Plaintiffs: Robin D. Dunn
Defendant Max E. Pease: Ryan Janis
Defendants Brent Weddle & Charles Weddle: Charles M. Murphy
1:07:27
Counsel are present on the telephone. Plaintiffs Mr. McCandless and Ms.
Blackeagle are present in the courtroom.
1:07:30
Court reviews case and Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider before the Court. It is
a Motion to Reconsider Court's Order to enforce settlement There is supporting
information submitted by Mr. Dunn since that hearing that the Court didn't have before.
Court is ready to proceed with argument
1:09:00
Mr. Dunn presents Plaintiffs argument. They brought something new that
Judge didn't have before when Court made first ruling. There was a breakdown in
relationship between Plaintiff Mr. McCandless and his previous attorney Mr. Hally. There
was no written agreement, no settlement agreement and no checks signed or endorsed.
1:13:57
Mr. Janis presents Defendant Pease's argument. An agreement was entered
into in summer 2016. The binding oral contract should be enforced. There has been
nothing submitted that should change Court's decision. He asks Court to uphold previous
decision.
1:15:59
Mr. Murphy presents Defendants Weddle's argument The checks were
forwarded to Mr. Hally and haven't been returned.
1:16:45

Mr. Janis responds. The checks weren't forwarded back to his office.

1:17:00
courtroom.

Court responds. Mr. McCandless has the 4 checks in his hand in the

Court Minutes

1

May 24, 2017
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1:17:27
Mr. Dunn responds and presents argument. Mr. McCandless never endorsed
checks and not going to endorse. There is an affidavit of State Farm stating they stopped
ability to cash checks, they didn't know what was going on.
1:19:13
Court responds. Do have substantially more from Plaintiffs now then had at
time of Motion to Enforce Settlement This is an appropriate case for reconsideration of
Order. Court reconsiders and sets aside Order to enforce Settlement Court will put case
back on Court calendar and will set for a scheduling conference. Mr. Dunn is to provide an
Order to Set Aside. Mr. McCandless is to send checks back to Mr. Dunn so he can return to
appropriate parties.
1:22:18

Court in recess

PAMeLA SCHNelD&R

~

Court Minutes

2

May 24, 2017
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MAY/25/2017/THU II: 17 AM

P. 002/003

FAX No.

DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Robin D. DWlll, Esq., ISB #2903
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. 0. Box277
Rigby, rD 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)

CL

p

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO
DANA R. McCANDLESS and,
MABEL ROBIN BLACKEAGLE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MAX E. PEASE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

)
)
)·
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-13-01332
ORDER ON MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

The parties to this action met telephonically to consider plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider the granting of Enforcement of .an Oral Settlement. The plaintiffs were
represented by Robin D. Dunn, Esq.; the defendant, Max Pease, was represented by J. Nick
Crawford, Esq.; and the defendants, Weddle, were represented by Charles M. Murphy, Esq.
IT IS HERBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Order on Motion to enforce settlement is hereby set aside.

2. The motion to reconsider is granted and the parties are returned to the active
case load.
3. The court will schedule a conference to set trial, pretrial ttiatters, and other
pertinent matters.

4. The plaintiffs shall present the four (4) checks/drafts in the plaintiffs' possession
to be returned to the appropriate defendants' counsel

DATED this

z_).-,

day of May, 2017.
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MAY/25/2017/THU 11: 17 AM

FAX No.

P. 003/003

NOTICE OF ENTRY

(?ft

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .3Q..:. clay of May, 2017, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing-was delivered to the following pe.rson(s) by:

DOCUMENT SERVED:

Order on Motion to Reconsider

ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDMDUALS SERVED:

J. Nick Crawford, Esq.
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701

(x) Facsimile - 208-344-7077
() U.S. Mail

( ) Courthouse Box

Charles M. Mwphy, Esq.

(x) Facsimile - 208-319-3823

950 W. Bannock, Ste. 1100
Boise, Idaho 83702

( ) U.S. Mail

Robin D. Dunn
P.O. Box277

(x) Facsimile 201.745-8i61S lllP

( ) Courthouse Box

Rigby, ID 83442
Nez Perce Courthouse: c/ o Judge Brudie 208.799-3058:

'\
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
DANA R. MCCANDLESS and
)
MABEL ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband )
andmfe,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
)
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES
)
1-5,
)
)
)
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 2013-01332
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named case be set for

J

uR1 trial

before the Honorable JEFF M. BRUDIE, District Judge, at the Nez Perce County Courthouse, at
Lemston, Idaho, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on the ~day of

;J/;,..g.c II

, 2 o/,8

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following:
disclosure of Plaintiff's expert ,witnesses, including compliance with IRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(l), shall be on or before

-------'-/V--+-!d---+----7

disclosure of Defendants' expert witnesses, including compliance with IRCP

/ii. . .)_'/'/
. . _ __
26(b)(4)(A)(l ), shall be on or before _ _ _
I

I

I

any summary judgment motions must be sch dule and heard by_ _,J,____,_'/t_'_
/J __
all discovery shall be completed by

,.

that a pre-trial conference shall be held on

r-,,'("

3

~/ B

2--

3

k J~/8

I

I

at the hour of2:00

p.m. Lead counsel trying the case must be personally present at the pretrial conference. Counsel are
to notify the Court if they wish the pre-trial conference to be telephonic.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party
shall:
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pretrial hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses
asserted by that party;
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial
conference to be marked;
3) Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared
to submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing;

4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibit or to make
specific objections to its admissibility;
5) Furnish opposing counsel with names and addresses of all
witnesses, the nature of their testimony, experts' reports, and like
instruments, and complete all other matters which may expedite both
the pre-trial and the trial of this case;

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

2
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'

.
6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement;
7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions oflaw
relied upon;
8) Submit to the court and counsel a copy of all jury instructions
counsel intends to request at least seven (7) days before the scheduled
trial date. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies, each
containing citations of authority. The Court uses the following
instructions from IDJI2d and it is not necessary for counsel to submit
them: 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1, 1.11, 1.13, 1.15.2, 1.20.1, and 9.00.
DATEDthis

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

2.:z_

dayofJUNE2017.

3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING FOR TRIAL AND
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE was:
~

_ _ hand delivered via court basket, or

L

mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2017, to:

p

t' iii'

day of JUNE

J. Nick Crawford
PO Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009

Charles M. Murphy
950 W. Bannock St, Ste 1100
Boise, ID 83 702-6140

Robin D. Dunn
POBox277
Rigby,ID 83442

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

4
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
)
DANA R. MCCANDLESS and
MABEL ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband )
)
andMfe,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES )
)
1-5,
)
)
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 2013-01332
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named case be set for~Z.J trial
before the Honorable JEFF M. BRUDIE, District Judge, at the Nez Perce County Courthouse, at
Lewiston, Idaho, at tlle hour of 9:00 am. on the

a :.y b
of

tc.t>n ;,.,-;<:.

1

2r, ,18

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following:
disclosure of Plaintiffs expert witnesses, including compliance with IRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(l ), shall be on or before _ _ _ _ _ __ ,
disclosure of Defendants' expert witnesses, including compliance with IRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(l), shall be on or before _ _ _ _ _ __

any SUIIIJll&'Y judgment motions must be scheduled~ heard by
all discovery shall be completed by

I I'

ftiPM~

It

that a pre-trial conference shall be held on

;z./4
If

I

/-:h7/IJ

at the hour of2:00

p.m. Lead counsel trying the case must be personally present at the pretrial conference. Counsel are
to notify the Court if they wish the pre-trial conference to be telephonic.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party
shall:
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pretrial hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses
asserted by that party;
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial
conference to be marked;
3) Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared
to submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing;
4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibit or to make
specific objections to its admissibility;
5) Furnish opposing counsel with names and addresses of all
witnesses, the nature of their testimony, experts' reports, and like
instruments, and complete all other matters which may expedite both
the pre-trial and the trial of this case;

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

2
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6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement;
7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions of law
relied upon;

8) Submit to the court and counsel a copy of all jury instructions
counsel intends to request at least seven (7) days before the scheduled
trial date. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies, each
containing citations of authority. The Court uses the following
instructions from 1Dll2d and it is not necessary for counsel to submit
them: 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1, 1.11, 1.13, 1.15.2, 1.20.1, and 9.00.
DATED this

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

2- Y

day of March 2018.

3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING FOR TRIAL AND
PRETRIALCONFERENCE was:
_ 6 n d delivered via court basket, or

_L.. mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this z._~y of March
2018, to:
J. Nick Crawford
PO Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009
Charles M. Murphy
950 W. Bannock St, Ste 1100
Boise, ID 83 702-6140
RobinD. Dunn
POBox277
Rigby,ID 83442

PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR

TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

4
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Electronically Filed
12/5/2018 3:15 PM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Amber Allen, Deputy Clerk

J. Nick Crawford, ISB 3220
BRAS SEY CRAWFORD, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 215
P.0. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Email: jnc@brassey.net
icourt@brassey.net
Attorneys for Defendant Max E. Pease

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DANA R. McCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 13-01332
Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES
1-5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the above-captioned Defendant by and through counsel of record, Brassey
Crawford, and hereby submit the following requested jury instructions based on IDJl.2d. Defendant
reserves the right to add, delete, modify or supplement this list.
1.

IDJl.2d No. 1.00

2.

IDJI.2d No. 1.01

3.

IDJI.2d No. 1.03

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - I
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4.

IDJl.2d No. 1.03.1

5.

IDJl.2d No. 1.04

6.

IDJl.2d No. 1.09

7.

IDJI.2d No. 1.11

8.

IDJI.2d No. 1.13

9.

IDJI.2d No. 1.13.1

10.

IDJl.2d No. 1.15.2

11.

IDJl.2d No. 1.17

12.

IDJl.2d No. 1.20.1

13.

IDJl.2d No. 1.20.2

14.

IDJI.2d No. 1.24.2

15.

IDJI.2d No. 1.41.3

16.

IDJI 2d No. 1.41.4.1

17.

IDJI 2d No. 1.41.4.2

18.

IDJI.2d No. 2.00.2

19.

IDJI.2d No. 2.20

20.

IDJl.2d No. 2.22

21.

IDJI.2d No. 2.30. l

22.

IDJI.2d No. 9.00

23.

IDJl.2d No. 9.01

24.

IDJI 2d No. 9.02

25.

IDJI 2d No. 9.14

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2
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DATED this 5th day of December, 2018.
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC

By

Isl J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant Max E. Pease

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5111 day of December, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS upon each of the
following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses
indicated below:
Robin D. Dunn
Dunn Law Offices
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.0. Box 277
Rigby, Idaho 83442
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com
Charles Murphy
420 W. Main Street
Suite 301
Boise, Idaho 83702
boisescefile@geico.com

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 745-8160
E-File

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 319-3823
E-File

Isl J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.

It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is
your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try
to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence.

If an

attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial,
I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or

1
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speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you
had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in
your deliberations in this case.

IDJI2d 1.00.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER

2
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.

If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted
from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them
to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.

IDJI2d 1.01.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
Page 63

INSTRUCTION NO. 3
There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their

employees, or any of the witnesses.

2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case

with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the
case, you must report it to me promptly.

3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to

deliberate at the close of the entire case.

4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and

have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gam a greater

understanding of the case.

6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

IDJl2d 1.03.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4

Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves
or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, until after I finally
submit the case to you.

IDJI2d 1.03. l.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to decide.
You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.

IDJI2d 1.04.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to
be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average
the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the
damage award or percentage of negligence.

IDJI2d 1.09.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER

Page 67

INSTRUCTION NO. 7
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me
by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.

IDJl2d 1.1 I.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8

I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Thereforet the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginningt onets sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that positiont even if shown that it
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For yout as for
met there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreementt if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

IDJl2d 1.13.

GIVEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
Page 69

INSTRUCTION NO. 9

Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-fourths
of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to
it.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you
must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence
with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your
own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your
honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.

IDJl2d 1.13. l.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10

On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside
over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions
on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on
each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more,
but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who
will then return you into open court.

IDJl2d 1.15.2.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the
sincere thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone
else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is
entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are
not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you
choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like about
your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in discussing the
case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any discussion
has begun, you may report it to me.

IDJI2d 1.1 7.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.

IDJ12d 1.20. I.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true.
This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than
not true.

IDJI2d 1.20.2.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such
convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI2d 1.24.2.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15
On the defendant['s/s'] claim of _ _ _ _ against _ _ _ _, the defendant[s]
[has/have] the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The plaintiff violated the Idaho statute in force providing that no
person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle
without first giving an appropriate signal to the driver of any
vehicle immediately to the rear when there is an opportunity to give
such a signal. Idaho Code§ 49-808(3).

2.

The plaintiffs violation of the statute was a prxoimate cause of any
injuries to the plaintiff.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the plaintiff violate the Idaho statute providing that "no person
shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first
giving an appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle
immediately to the rear when there is an opportunity to give such a
signal"; and, if so, was that violation a proximate cause of her
injuries?

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of
all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this
question "no."

IDJl2d 1.41.3.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 16

The plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The defendant was negligent.

2.

The plaintiff was damaged.

3.

The negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the
damage to the plaintiff.

4.

The elements of damage and the amounts thereof.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Was the defendant negligent, and if so, was the negligence a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages?

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof required and
you should answer this question "No."

IDJI2d 1.41.4.1.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17

In this case, the defendant[s] [has/have] alleged that the plaintiff[s] [was/were] negligent.
On this defense, the defendant[s] [has/have] the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1.

The plaintiff[s] [was/were] negligent.

2.

The negligence of the plaintiff[s] was a proximate cause of
[his/her/their] own injuries.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
(Was/Were] the plaintiffls] negligent, and if so was the
plaintiff['s/s'] negligence a proximate cause of [his/her/their]
injuries?

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the defendant has not met the burden of proof required
and you should answer this question "No."

IDJI2d 1.41.4.2.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18

It was the duty of both plaintiffls] and defendant[s], before and at the time of the
occurrence, to use ordinary care for the safety of both themselves and each other, [and for both
their own and each other's property].

IDJl2d 2.00.2.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably
careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.

IDJI2d 2.20.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20

There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an
appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is an
opportunity to give such a signal. Idaho Code§ 49-808(3).
A violation of the statute is negligence.

IDJI2d 2.22.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the
damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the
injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
[There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of
two or more persons or entities contribute concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to
which each contributes to the injury.]

IDJI2d 2.30.1.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 22
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

IDJl2d 9.00.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 23

If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury must
detennine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any
damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A.

B.

Non-economic damages
1.

The nature of the injuries;

2.

The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;

3.

The impainnent of abilities to perform usual activities;

4.

The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition.

Economic damages
1.

The reasonable value of necessary medical care received
and expenses incurred as a result of the injury [and the
present cash value of medical care and expenses reasonably
certain and necessary to be required in the future] ;

2.

The reasonable value of the past earnings lost as a result of
the injury;

3.

[Any other specific item based upon the evidence.]

Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.

IDJ12d 9.01.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24

A person who has a preexisting condition or disability is entitled to recover damages for
the aggravation of such preexisting condition, if any, that is proximately caused by the
occurrence. The person is not entitled to recover damages for the preexisting condition or
disability itself.
If you find that before the occurrence causing the injuries in this case the plaintiff [name]

had a preexisting bodily condition or disability, and further find that because of the new
occurrence in this case the preexisting condition or disability was aggravated, then you should
consider the aggravation of the condition or disability in fixing the damages in this case. You
should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the occurrence, or any
aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by reason of this occurrence.
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition or disability prior to this
occurrence and the condition or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability
accordingly. If no apportionment can reasonably be made by you, then the defendant[s] [is/are]
liable for the entire damage.

IDJI2d 9.02.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25

A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be
recovered.

IDJI2d 9.14.
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DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 2
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IDJI 1.17
IDJI 1.00 - Introductory instruction to jury
INSTRUCTION NO.

These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to
this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based
upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on
sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it

is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole,
not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are
given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance
of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through
the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial.
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence,
and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys
may help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not
evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should
disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the
trial, I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or
to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 3
Page 89

are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection,
which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider
such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown.
Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to
the answer.
[There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or
the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection !instructed that the answer or
remark be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it
from your minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but
must treat it as though you had never heard it.]
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of
the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and
what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the
experience and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating
testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what
you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you
use in making the more important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same
considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this case.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 4
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IDJI 1.01 - Deliberation procedures
INSTRUCTION NO.

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 5
Page 91

IDJI 1.03 - - Admonition to jury

INSTRUCTION NO.
There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or

their employees, or any of the witnesses.
2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone todiscuss the

case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision
in the case, you must report it to me promptly.
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury

room to deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony

and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater

understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 6
Page 92

IDJI 1.04 - Insurance cautionary
INSTRUCTION NO.

Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 7
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IDJI 1.05 - Statement of claims not evidence
INSTRUCTION NO.

Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be
decided.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 8
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IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence

INSTRUCTION NO.
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more
probably true than not true.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 9
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IDJI 1.22 - Deposition testimony
INSTRUCTION NO.

Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony
taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing [and upon DVD]. This evidence
is entitled to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the
witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the
testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your
deliberations.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED mRY
INSTRUCTIONS - 10
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IDJI 1.24.1 - Circumstantial evidence without definition
INSTRUCTION NO

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as areasonable method of proof and
each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 11
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IDJI 1.40.3 - General format for charging instruction, general verdict, plaintiffs case with
affirmative defenses, no special interrogatories.

INSTRUCTION NO.
The plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. That either one or all of the Defendants were negligent;

2. That the conduct of one or all of the Defendants was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs'
injuries; and
3. Plaintiffs' economic damages directly attributable to one or all of the Defendant's
negligent conduct, if any. In this case, the defendant has asserted the affirmative defense
that the Plaintiff Steveson was comparatively at fault for causing her claimed injuries and
damages. On this affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the
following propositions:
1. That the Plaintiff Dana McCandless was negligent; and

2. That the conduct of Plaintiff Dana McCandless at the time of the accident was a
proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, if any.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the plaintiff has proved each of
the propositions required of the plaintiff for the case in chief, and further find that the
defendant has failed to prove each of the propositions required for the affirmative defense,
your verdict should be for the plaintiff. If you find that the plaintiff has failed to prove each
of the propositions required for the case in chief, or fmd that the defendant has proved
each of the propositions required for the affirmative defense, your verdict should be for the
defendant.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 12
Page 98

IDJI 1.41.4.1 - Charging instructions, negligence case, multiple defendants or parties, with
comparative negligence.
For use with special jury verdict on interrogatories; three parts.

INSTRUCTION NO.
The plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. The defendant(s) was negligent.

2. The plaintiff(s) was injured.
3. The negligence of a defendant was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff(s).
4. The elements of damage and the amounts thereof. You will be asked the following
question on the jury verdict form:
Was the defendant negligent, and if so, was the negligence a proximate cause of the injuries
to the plaintiff?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has

been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof
required and you should answer this question "No."

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 13
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IDJI 1.41.4.2 - Companion instruction-defendant's burden

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, the defendant has alleged that the plaintiff Dana McCandless was negligent.
On this defense, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1. The plaintiff was negligent.
2. The negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of [his/her] own injuries.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Was the plaintiff negligent, and if so was the plaintifrs negligence a proximate cause of his
injuries?
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the defendant has not met the burden of proof
required and you should answer this question "No."

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 14
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IDJI 2.00.2 - Duty of care - both plaintiff and defendant

INSTRUCTION NO.

It was the duty of both plaintiffs and defendants, before and at the time of the occurrence,
to use ordinary care for the safety of both themselves and each other and for both their
own and each other's property.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 15
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IDJI 2.20 - Definition of negligence

INSTRUCTION NO.
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" means the
care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by
the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably
careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not
do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how
a reasonably careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS -16
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IDJI 2.30.2 - Proximate cause - "substantial factor," without "but for" test.

INSTRUCTION NO.
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need not
be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss
or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have
occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent
conduct of two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors
in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of tl:ie injury
regardless of the extent to which· each contributes to the injury.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 17
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IDJI 9.00 - Cautionary instruction on damages
INSTRUCTION NO.
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 18
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IDJI 9.01 - Damage instruction for injuries to plaintiff- general case

INSTRUCTION NO.
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury must
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for
any damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A. Non-economic damages
1. The nature of the injuries;

2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;
4. The disfigurement caused by the injuries;
5. The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition.
B. Economic damages
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses incurred as

a result of the injury;
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 19
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IDJI 9.02 - -Aggravation of pre-existing condition

INSTRUCTION NO.
A person who has a pre-existing condition or disability is entitled to recover damages for
the aggravation of such preexisting condition, if any, that is proximately caused by the
occurrence. The person is not entitled to recover damages for the pre-existing condition or
disability itself.
If you find that before the occurrence causing the injuries in this case the plaintiff had a

preexisting bodily condition or disability, and further find that because of the new
occurrence in this case the pre-existing condition or disability was aggravated, then you
should consider the aggravation of the condition or disability in fixing the damages in this
case. You should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the
occurrence, or any aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by
reason of this occurrence.
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition or disability prior to this
occurrence and the condition or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability
accordingly. If no apportionment can reasonably be made by you, then the defendant is
liable for the entire damage.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - 20
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IDJI 9.14 - Mitigation of damages
INSTRUCTION NO.
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be
recovered.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
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IDJI 1.09 - Quotient verdicts
INSTRUCTION NO.

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages
are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance
to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the

amount of the damage award or percentage of negligence.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
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IDJI 1.11 - Communications with court
INSTRUCTION NO.

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a
note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with
me by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED IDRY
INSTRUCTIONS - 23
Page 109

IDJI 1.13 - Concluding remarks

INSTRUCTION NO.
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few
minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the
jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the
outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the
beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates,
but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment
and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each
of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
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IDJI 1.15 .2 - Completion of verdict form on special interrogatories

INSTRUCTION NO.
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside
over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the
instructions on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine
or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine
agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if
nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the
verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who will
I
.
then return you into open court.

DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE'S REQUESTED JURY
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IDJI 1.17 - Post verdict jury instruction
INSTRUCTION NO.

You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the sincere
thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone else.
For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is
entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are
not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you
choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like
about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in
discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or
after any discussion has begun, you may report it to me.

DATED tlris

&Iii

illly of

Qw,...hlf-L

, 2018.
ARLES M. MURPHY

. Murphy I,
Attorney for Defendants,
Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle
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CERTIFICATE OF ~ERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the &J.h day of
2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be forw~ded in the manner indicated below to the
following person(s):

Robin Dunn
Dunn Law Offices
477 Pleasant Country Ln
PO Box277
Rigby, ID 83442-0277

J. Nick Crawford
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Ct.
Ste. 215
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701

[
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[
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[

]
]
]
]
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]

E-File
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 745-8160

E-File
icourt@brassey.net
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 344-7077

Attorney for Defendants,
Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle
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Filed: December 06, 2018 at 2:57 PM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
By: J ~ Ko-ug,}v Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Dana R McCandless, Mabel Robin Blackeagle
vs.
Max E Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle

Case No. CV-2013-1332

JUDGE: Brudie, Jeff M.

DATE:December06,2018

CLERK:JanetKough

LOCATION: In Chambers

HEARING TYPE: Pre-trial Conference

COURT REPORTER:

Court Minutes

INTERPRETER:

Parties Present:
Crawford, John Nick
Dunn, Robin Dwain
Murphy, Charles
Maurice

Attorney of
Record
Attorney of
Record
Attorney of
Record

Parties:
Dana R McCandless; Mabel
Robin Blackeagle

Attorney:

Robin Dwain Dunn; Robin Dwain Dunn

Max E Pease; Brent
Weddle; Charles Weddle

Attorney:

John Nick Crawford; Charles Maurice Murphy;
Charles Maurice Murphy

Hearing Start Time: 2:00 PM
Journal Entries:
- Crt calls counsel.
Case going forward to trial.
Parties discuss scheduling and time needed for case.

Hearing End Time: 02:30 PM
Exhibits:

COURT MINUTES
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Filed:12/12/2018 07:46:56
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Kough, Janet

LAW OFFICE OF CHARLES M. MURPHY
Charles M. Murphy, ISB #4991
Benjamin R. Jensen, ISB #10007
V eltex Building
420 W. Main St., Suite 301
Boise, ID 83 702-7284
Telephone: (208) 803-3110
Facsimile: (208) 336-1981
BoiseSCEFile@geico.com
Attorneys for Defendant,
Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DANA R. MCCANDLESS AND MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, HUSBAND AND
WIFE,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2013-1332

ORDER TO DISMISS
DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE
AND CHARLES WEDDLE ONLY

vs.
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, AND JOHN DOES 15,,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on the parties' Stipulation for Dismissal with
Prejudice as to Defendants Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(l)(ii), and the Court having reviewed the pleadings and records on file, the
Court does ORDER AND THIS DOES ORDER Defendants Brent Weddle and Charles Weddle
be dismissed as parties to this case.
Signed: 12/11/2018 03:09 PM
DATED this - - -------

BLE JEFF BRUDIE
District Judge
ORDER TO DISMISS AS TO DEFENDANTS BRENT WEDDLE AND CHARLES WEDDLE
ONLY -1
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 12/12/2018 07:47 AM
I h ereb y cert1.fy that on _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ , I cause d a true an d correct copy o f the
foregoing instrument to be forwarded in the manner indicated below to the following person(s):

Robin Dunn
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
4 77 Pleasant Country Ln.
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442-0277
Attorney for Plaintiff

J. Nick Crawford
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Ct., Suite 215
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701
Attorney for Defendant

Charles M. Murphy
LAW OFFICE OF CHARLES M. MURPHY
V eltex Building
420 W. Main St., Suite 301
Boise, ID 83 702-7284
Attorney for Defendant
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E-File
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 745-8160
E-File
jnc@brassey.net
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 344-7077

E-File
BoiseSCEFile@geico.com
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-1981

Deputy Clerk
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Filed: December 17, 2018 at 12:00 PM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
By: J ~

LCfA'\ilvi¼' Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Dana R McCandless, Mabel Robin Blackeagle
vs.
Max E Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle

Court Minutes

JUDGE: Brudie, Jeff M.

DATE:December17,2018

CLERK: Jenny Landrus

LOCATION: Courtroom 1
COURT REPORTER: Linda Carlton

HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial

Parties Present:
McCandless, Plaintiff
Dana R
Blackeagle, Mabel Robin
Crawford, John Nick
Dunn, Robin Dwain

Pease, Max E

Case No. CV-2013-1332

Part 1

Plaintiff

Attorney for
Defendant
Attorney for
Plaintiff
Defendant

Hearing Start Time: 9:02 AM
Journal Entries:
090250 Mr. Dunn present with plaintiffs. Mr. Crawford present with defendant.
090251 Court addresses potential jurors.
090435 Clerk calls the roll of the jury.
090705 Clerk calls names of next two jurors to fill seats. Mary Barry and Michael Best.
090915 Clerk administers jury voir dire oath.
090932 Court addresses jury-introduces Court staff.
091046 Mr. Dunn introduces himself and plaintiffs Dana McCandless and Mabel Robin
Blackeagle and reviews case.
091511 Mr. Crawford introduces himself and Max Pease and reviews case.
091638 Court addresses jury re: schedule and procedures.
092000 Court begins voir dire questioning.
092040 Court questions counsel re: juror #4 Eddy Chapman.
092044 Counsel has no objection to excusing juror #4 Eddy Chapman.
092049 Court excuses Eddy Chapman for cause.
092113 Clerk calls juror #26 Ryan Young.
092132 Court continues voir dire questioning.
092201 Court questions juror #23 as to knowing Ms. Blackeagle.
092303 Court continues voir dire questioning.

COURT MINUTES
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092709 Court questions juror #1 Karen Seldon. She delivers Meals on Wheels on Tuesdays
and does not have a replacement.
092735 Court questions juror #7 Thomas Sanford. He states he is sick.
092811 Court questions juror #10 Lisa Scharback. She has young children on Christmas break
and nobody to watch them.
092859 Court continues voir dire questioning.
092915 Court has counsel approach the bench.
092959 Court excuses jurors #2, #7 and #20 for cause.
093050 Clerk calls juror #27 Brandi Polomsky.
093112 Clerk calls juror #28 Aaron Fitting.
093152 Court continues voir dire questioning.
093228 Clerk calls juror #29 Adele Barnes.
093324 Mr. Dunn begins voir dire questioning.
100106 Mr. Dunn passes panel for cause ..
100201 Court admonishes jury and takes a brief recess.
101902 Court back in session at 10:19 a.m.
101905 Mr. Crawford begins voir dire questioning.
102500 Mr. Crawford requests #10 Adele Barnes be excused.
102510 Mr. Dunn questions juror #10 Adele Barnes.
102654 Court excuses juror #10 Adele Barnes for cause.
102745 Clerk calls juror #30 Valerie Schatz.
102830 Court questions juror #30 Valerie Schatz.
102855 Mr. Crawford questions juror #30 Valerie Schatz.
103131 Mr. Crawford continues voir dire questioning of entire jury.
103956 Mr. Crawford passes panel for cause.
104020 Mr. Dunn has no questions for juror #30 Valerie Schatz.
104048 Court questions counsel re: releasing remainder of panel. Counsel has no objection to
releasing remainder of panel in the audience.
104108 Court excuses remainder of jury panel.
104129 Court addresses jury re: peremptory process.
104216 Court will take a 5 minutes recess then proceed with peremptory challenges after the
break.
Plaintiff: 1. Randy Olson
2. Elaine Soloniuk
3. Ronald Halsey
4. David Mullikan
5. Patrick Schlangen
Defendant: 1. Charles Gauger
2. Carrie Hartshorn
3. Carmalita Bohnee
4. Pass
5. Aaron Fitting
105608 Court back in session.
105613 Court seats jurors. The jury is constituted as follows: Brandi Polomsky, Ryan Young,
Mark Edelblute, Barbara Potts, Michael Best, Valerie Schatz, Kelsie Jordan, Jennifer Barry,
Zachary Nixon, Mary Barry, Jane Reed, Stacy Fields, Kay Solem.
105835 Court addresses jurors.
COURT MINUTES
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105908 Mr. Dunn accepts the jury.
105915 Mr. Crawford accepts the jury.
105924 Clerk administers oath to jury to try the case.
105945 Court releases remaining jurors.
110037 Court has counsel approach bench.
110116 Court addresses jury re: lunch recess and resuming trial at 1:00.
110220 Court admonishes the jury.
110350 Court in recess until 1:00 p.m.
010350 Court back in session.
010410 Mr. Crawford addresses Court. He didn't file a motion, but would like to remind the
parties to not mention insurance when testifying.
010434 Mr. Dunn indicates he has discussed this with his clients.
010437 Court-that will be the instructions.
010540 Bailiff brings in the jury, all present.
010559 Court reads opening jury instructions.
011239 Mr. Dunn presents opening statement.
011950 Mr. Crawford objects-relevance.
012002 Court overrules objection.
012005 Mr. Dunn continues opening statement.
012602 Mr. Dunn has concluded and requests side bar with Court and counsel.
012633 Court informs jury we will take a 5 minute recess.
012648 Recess
013415 Court back in session.
013430 Bailiff brings in the jury, all present.
013506 Mr. Crawford presents opening statement.
014020 Court addresses Mr. Dunn on his witness scheduled for 2:00. Are they here?
014053 Mr. Dunn relays he is having the bailiff check. If not, he can go in a different direction.
014115 Mr. Dunn calls Max Pease to the stand.
014304 Mr. Dunn begins direct examination of Max Pease.
015130 Mr. Dunn requests to have Plaintiff's Exhibit #4 handed to witness.
015157 Mr. Crawford asks to look at the original of Plaintiff's Exhibit #4.
015219 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Max Pease.
015353 Mr. Dunn moves for admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit #4.
015359 Mr. Crawford would like redactions re-done.
015441 Court asks Mr. Crawford what he would like redacted.
015455 Mr. Crawford shows Court.
015525 Court admits Plaintiff's Exhibit #4.
015549 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Max Pease.
020253 Mr. Dunn requests witness be handed Plaintiff's Exhibit #3, page 15.
020432 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Max Pease.
020456 Mr. Crawford objects.
020504 Mr. Dunn agrees and will ask a different question.
020525 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Max Pease.
021406 Mr. Crawford begins cross examination of Max Pease.
021925 Mr. Crawford requests sidebar.
022052 Mr. Crawford continues examination of Max Pease.
022209 Mr. Dunn objects-question assumes facts not in evidence, not expert.
COURT MINUTES
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022230
022233
022307
022321
022330
022426
022505
022508
022612
022639
025207
025210
025254
025348
025925
025930
025934
030335
030342
030349
030424
030431
030446
030530
031256
031259
031302
031442
031502
031706
031735
031749
031809

Mr. Crawford withdraws question.
Mr. Crawford continues examination of Max Pease.
Mr. Dunn has no further questions.
Witness steps down.
Court informs jury that Mr. Pease's wife is not physically able to testify at the trial.
Mr. Dunn informs the jury that Mr. Weddle was supposed to be here at 2:00/
Bailiff indicates Mr. Weddle is not in lobby of other courtrooms.
Mr. Dunn requests side bar.
Court addresses jury.
Court takes recess.
Court back in session.
Bailiff brings in the jury, all present.
Mr. Dunn calls Brent Weddle to the stand, sworn by clerk.
Mr. Dunn begins direct examination of Brent Weddle.
Mr. Crawford objects-leading.
Court-sustained.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Brent Weddle.
Mr. Crawford objects.
Court-sustained.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Brent Weddle.
Mr. Crawford has no cross examination of witness.
Witness steps down.
Mr. Dunn calls Robin Blackeagle, sworn by clerk.
Mr. Dunn begins direct examination of Robin Blackeagle.
Mr. Crawford objects-leading.
Court-sustained.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Robin Blackeagle.
Mr. Dunn wants witness handed Plaintiff's Exhibit #7.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Robin Blackeagle.
Mr. Crawford objects-tax returns were never produced.
Mr. Dunn-don't know if they were produced.
Court has Mr. Dunn re-phrase the question.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Robin Blackeagle.

Minutes continued in Part 2 of 12/17/18 Court minutes (seperate document)
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Filed: February 07, 2019 at 11 :39 AM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
By: J e-t'\.¥\.Y

LCfA!Uirl.Mt' Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Dana R McCandless, Mabel Robin Blackeagle
vs.
Max E Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle

Case No. CV-2013-1332

JUDGE: Brudie, Jeff M.

DATE:December17,2018

CLERK: Jenny Landrus

LOCATION: Courtroom 1

HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial

COURT REPORTER: Linda Carlton

Parties Present:
Blackeagle, Mabel Robin
Crawford, John Nick
Dunn, Robin Dwain
McCandless, Dana R
Pease, Max E

Court Minutes

Part 2

Plaintiff
Attorney of
Record-Def
Attorney of
Record-Pit
Plaintiff
Defendant

Hearing Start Time: 3:32 PM
Journal Entries:
- 12/17/18 Jury Trial minutes continued
033212 Mr. Crawford objects--hearing this for the first time.
033234 Court has jury leave the courtroom.
033327 Court has Mr. Dunn ask the question again.
033333 Mr. Dunn asks the question again.
033500 Mr. Dunn addresses Court.
033509 Mr. Crawford addresses Court.
033545 Mr. Dunn addresses Court further.
0337 42 Court addresses Mr. Dunn.
033816 Court--confine exam of Ms. Blackeagle to her observations.
033828 Mr. Dunn addresses Court. Mr. Crawford told him he didn't object to those exhibits.
033850 Mr. Crawford, no objection.
033901 Mr. Crawford stipulates to Plfs Exhibit 19. He also addresses chiropractic bills from
May, June, August & September of 2018. He didn't see these until this morning.
033950 Mr. Dunn indicates that's 1275.
034030 Court--Plfs Exhibit 19 admitted by stipulation.
034110 Mr. Dunn addresses Court.
034127 Court will allow Mr. Dunn to ask Ms. Blackeagle what she did and observed. Not
allowed to inquire about this year.
034152 Court sustains Mr. Crawford's objection to that line of inquiry.
034212 Bailiff brings in the jury, all present.
COURT MINUTES
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034252 Court informs jury that the objection was sustained.
034302 Mr. Dunn would like Plfs Exhibit 19 published to the jury and passed around.
034328 Court informs jury that Plfs Exhibit 19 has been admitted and that exhibit will be
passed around to the jurors.
034612 Mr. Dunn relays to Court there has been a stipulation to Plf Exhibit 20 also and would
like the jury to look it.
034625 Mr. Crawford has no objection to Plfs Exhibit 20.
035339 Court has admitted Plfs Exhibits 19 & 20 and they have been published to the jury.
035352 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Robin Blackeagle.
040134 Mr. Dunn would like the witness handed Plfs Exhibit 18.
040212 Mr. Dunn--except for 1 page, counsels stipulate to Plfs Exhibit 18---they remove that
page.
040306 Court admits Plfs Exhibit 18 with 1 page removed.
040333 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Robin Blackeagle.
040633 Mr. Crawford--page 4 is for services pre-dating the accident.
040716 Mr. Dunn--that should have been excluded also.
040728 Court removes page 4--Phoenix Radiology.
040738 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Robin Blackeagle.
041108 Mr. Dunn wants to question the witness on the page that was removed outside the
presence of the jury.
041142 Court admonishes the jury.
041324 Court excuses the jury for the day.
041338 Court takes brief recess.
041602 Court back on the record-- Mr. Dunn wants to bring up Plfs Exhibit 18A.
041630 Mr Dunn--counsel objected that it had not been disclosed.
041650 Mr. Crawford objects to exhibit and testimony about Plfs Exhibit 18A.
041719 Mr. Dunn addresses Court. He came into the case late and assumed everything
received from the prior attorney was supplied to Mr. Crawford.
041952 Court excludes Plfs Exhibit 18A--billings from Orofino Wellness Center--dates of
service for Ms. Blackeagle from May 2017 to September 2017. Court sustains Mr. Crawford's
objection to that.
042108 Court and counsel discuss witness starting tomorrow morning.
042136 Recess

Hearing End Time: 04:21 PM
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Electronically Filed
12/18/20181:47 PM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Amber Allen, Deputy Clerk

J. Nick Crawford, ISB 3220
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 215
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Email: jnc@brassey.net
icourt@brassey.net
Attorneys for Defendant Max E. Pease

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DANA R. McCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 13-01332
Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES
1-5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the above-captioned Defendant by and through counsel of record, Brassey
Crawford, and hereby supplement the following requested jury instructions based on IDJI.2d.
Defendant reserves the right to add, delete, modify or supplement this list.
1.

IDJI.2d No. 1.00

2.

IDJI.2d No. 1.01

3.

IDJI.2d No. 1.03

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1
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4.

IDJI.2d No. 1.03.1

5.

IDJI.2d No. 1.04

6.

IDJI.2d No. 1.09

7.

IDJI.2d No. 1.11

8.

IDJI.2d No. 1.13

9.

IDJI.2d No. 1.13.1

10.

IDJI.2d No. 1.15.2

11.

IDJI.2d No. 1.17

12.

IDJI.2d No. 1.20.1

13.

IDJI.2d No. 1.20.2

14.

IDJI.2d No. 1.24.2

15.

IDJI.2d No. 1.41.3 (modified)

16.

IDJI 2d No. 1.41.4.1

17.

IDJI 2d No. 1.41.4.2

18.

IDJI.2d No. 2.00.2

19.

IDJI.2d No. 2.20

20.

IDJI.2d No. 2.22

21.

IDJI.2d No. 2.30.1

22.

IDJI.2d No. 9.00

23.

IDJI.2d No. 9.01

24.

IDJI 2d No. 9.02

25.

IDJI 2d No. 9.07

26.

IDJI 2d No. 9.12

DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2
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27.

IDJI 2d No. 9.14

28.

Special Verdict Form

DATED this 18th day of December, 2018.
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC

By

Isl J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant Max E. Pease

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of December , 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the method and to the
addresses indicated below:
Robin D. Dunn
Dunn Law Offices
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, Idaho 83442
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com
Charles Murphy
420 W. Main Street
Suite 301
Boise, Idaho 83 702
boisescefile@geico.com

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 745-8160
E-File

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
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INSTRUCTION NO.

These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is

your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try
to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This

evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence.

If an

attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial,
I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my
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ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you
had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in
your deliberations in this case.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted
from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them
to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their

employees, or any of the witnesses.
2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case

with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the
case, you must report it to me promptly.
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to

deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and

have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater

understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves
or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, until after I finally
submit the case to you.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to decide.
You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to
be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average
the sum of each individual juror’s estimate as the method of determining the amount of the
damage award or percentage of negligence.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me
by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one’s sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other’s views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-fourths
of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to
it.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you
must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence
with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your
own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your
honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges – judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside
over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions
on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on
each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more,
but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who
will then return you into open court.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________

You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the
sincere thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone
else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is
entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are
not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you
choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like about
your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in discussing the
case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any discussion
has begun, you may report it to me.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression “if
you find” or “if you decide,” I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true.
This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than
not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such
convincing force as it may carry.

Page 140

INSTRUCTION NO. ________
On the defendant’s claim of comparative negligence against Brent
Weddle, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1. That Mr. Weddle was negligent.
2. The negligence of Mr. Weddle was a proximate cause of
Plaintiff’s injuries.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Was Mr. Weddle negligent, and if so was Mr. Weddle’s
negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of
these propositions has been proved, then you should answer this question
"yes." If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of
these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this question
"no."
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
The plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The defendant was negligent.

2.

The plaintiff was damaged.

3.

The negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the
damage to the plaintiff.

4.

The elements of damage and the amounts thereof.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Was the defendant negligent, and if so, was the negligence a
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question “Yes.” However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof required and
you should answer this question “No.”
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
In this case, the defendant[s] [has/have] alleged that the plaintiff[s] [was/were] negligent.
On this defense, the defendant[s] [has/have] the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1.

The plaintiff[s] [was/were] negligent.

2.

The negligence of the plaintiff[s] was a proximate cause of
[his/her/their] own injuries.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
[Was/Were] the plaintiff[s] negligent, and if so was the
plaintiff[’s/s’] negligence a proximate cause of [his/her/their]
injuries?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question “Yes.” However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the defendant has not met the burden of proof required
and you should answer this question “No.”
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
It was the duty of both plaintiff[s] and defendant[s], before and at the time of the
occurrence, to use ordinary care for the safety of both themselves and each other, [and for both
their own and each other’s property].
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
When I use the word “negligence” in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary
care in the management of one’s property or person. The words “ordinary care” mean the care a
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably
careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an
appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is an
opportunity to give such a signal. Idaho Code § 49-808(3).
A violation of the statute is negligence.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
When I use the expression “proximate cause,” I mean a cause which, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the
damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the
injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
[There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of
two or more persons or entities contribute concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to
which each contributes to the injury.]
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury must
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any
damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A.

B.

Non-economic damages
1.

The nature of the injuries;

2.

The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;

3.

The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;

4.

The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition.

Economic damages
1.

The reasonable value of necessary medical care received
and expenses incurred as a result of the injury [and the
present cash value of medical care and expenses reasonably
certain and necessary to be required in the future];

2.

The reasonable value of the past earnings lost as a result of
the injury;

3.

[Any other specific item based upon the evidence.]

Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.

Page 149

INSTRUCTION NO.
A person who has a preexisting condition or disability is entitled to recover damages for
the aggravation of such preexisting condition, if any, that is proximately caused by the
occurrence.

The person is not entitled to recover damages for the preexisting condition or

disability itself.
If you find that before the occurrence causing the injuries in this case the plaintiff [name]

had a preexisting bodily condition or disability, and further find that because of the new
occurrence in this case the preexisting condition or disability was aggravated, then you should
consider the aggravation of the condition or disability in fixing the damages in this case. You
should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the occurrence, or any
aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by reason of this occurrence.
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition or disability prior to this
occurrence and the condition or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability
accordingly. If no apportionment can reasonably be made by you, then the defendant[s] [is/are]
liable for the entire damage.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
If the jury decides that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
defendant, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and
fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused
by the defendant’s negligence.
The elements of damage to plaintiff’s property are:
[either]
1. The reasonable cost of necessary repairs to the damaged property, plus
the difference between its fair market value before it was damaged and its fair
market value after repairs.
[or]
1. The difference between the fair market value of the property
immediately before the occurrence, and its [salvage value] [fair market value
without repairs] after the occurrence.
[and, if applicable]
2. (Any incidental or consequential damage suffered by the plaintiff that is
within the foreseeable chain of proximate causation: e.g., “The reasonable rental
charges incurred by the plaintiff for substitute property during the time the subject
property was being repaired.”)
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
When I use the term “value” or the phrase “fair market value” or “actual cash
value” in these instructions as to any item of property, I mean the amount of
money that a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept for the
item in question in an open marketplace, in the item’s condition as it existed
immediately prior to the occurrence in question.

B. Instruction as to services:
When I use the term “value” or the phrase “fair market value” in these instructions
as to services rendered, I mean the amount of money that a willing employer
would pay and a willing employee would accept for the services in question, under
circumstances as existed immediately prior to the occurrence in question, in an
open marketplace.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ________
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be
recovered.
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INSTRUCTION NO. - - - -

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
We the jury answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows:

Question No. 1: Was the Defendant Max Pease negligent, and if so, was this negligence a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries?

Answer to Question No. 1:

Yes [

]

No [

]

If you answered this question "No" you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and advise
the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes", continue to the next question.

Question No. 2: Was Brent Weddle negligent, and if so was the negligence a proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injuries?

Answer to Question No. 2:

Yes [

]

No [

].

If you answered "Yes" to questions 1 and 2, answer Question No. 3. If you answered
"No" to Question No. 2, then skip to Question No. 4.

Instruction for Question No. 3: You will reach this question if you have found that the
defendant and the non-party Brent Weddle caused the injuries to the plaintiff. In this question,
you are to apportion the fault between these parties in terms of a percentage. As to each party or
individual to which you answered "Yes" to questions 1 and 2, determine the percentage of fault
for that party or individual, and enter the percentage on the appropriate line. Your total
percentages must equal I 00%.

Question No. 3: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the
following:
To the non-party, Brent Weddle

%
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To the Defendant, Max Pease

_____%
Total must equal

100%

Question No. 4: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff as a result
of the accident?
Answer to Question No. 4: We assess Plaintiff’s damages as follows:
1.

Economic damages,
as defined in the Instructions:

2.

$______________

Non-economic damages,
as defined in the Instructions:

$______________

__________________________________
FOREPERSON
___________________________________

_____________________________________

__________________________________

_____________________________________

___________________________________

_____________________________________

___________________________________

_____________________________________

___________________________________

_____________________________________

___________________________________

_____________________________________
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Filed: February 07, 2019 at 3:59 PM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
By: J e-t'\.¥\.Y

LCfA!Uirl.Mt' Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Dana R McCandless, Mabel Robin Blackeagle
vs.
Max E Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle

Case No. CV-2013-1332

JUDGE: Brudie, Jeff M.

DATE:December18,2018

CLERK: Jenny Landrus

LOCATION: Courtroom 1
COURT REPORTER: Linda Carlton

HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial

Parties Present:
Blackeagle, Mabel Robin
Crawford, John Nick
Dunn, Robin Dwain
McCandless, Dana R
Pease, Max E

Court Minutes

Plaintiff
Attorney of
Record
Attorney of
Record
Plaintiff
Defendant

Hearing Start Time: 9:03 AM
Journal Entries:
090342 Mr. Dunn present with plaintiffs. Mr. Crawford present with defendant.
090345 Court back in session.
090400 Mr. Dunn moves for admission of Plaintitrs Exhibits #7 and #16.
090420 Mr. Crawford has no objection.
090430 Court admits Plaintitrs Exhibits #7 and #16.
090504 Bailiff brings in the jury, all present.
090548 Court addresses the jury.
090606 Mr. Dunn calls Dr. Irwin Mulnick to the stand, sworn by clerk.
090654 Mr. Dunn begins direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
0917 45 Mr. Crawford objects--foundation, relevance.
0917 4 7 Mr. Dunn addresses Court.
091756 Court--overruled.
091801 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
091926 Mr. Crawford objects--foundation, relevance.
092012 Court has jury leave the courtroom.
092054 Court reviews previous question.
092112 Mr. Crawford addresses Court.
092214 Mr. Dunn addresses Court on the matter.
092329 Court asks witness for his answer to that question.
092336 Witness responds.
092419 Mr. Crawford has a problem with that answer in front of the jury.
092449 Mr. Dunn addresses Court.
COURT MINUTES

1
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092506
092524
092631
092640
092719
092752
092908
092917
092921
093023
093036
093039
093214
093243
093633
093720
093856
093910
093937
093949
093951
093956
094015
094027
094048
094051
094055
094121
094124
094304
094313
094326
094330
094525
094528
094530
094 710
094 740
094 743
094 758
094805
094808
094854
094915
095003
095030
095047

Mr. Crawford addresses Court.
Mr. Dunn addresses Court further.
Court overrules objection.
Bailiff returns the jury to the courtroom, all present.
Court addresses jury and lets them know the objection was overruled.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Crawford objects--foundation.
Court--sustained.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Crawford objects--foundation.
Court--overruled.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Dunn has witness handed Plaintiff's Exhibit #9.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Dunn has witness handed Plaintiff's Exhibit #10.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Dunn has witness handed Plaintiff's Exhibit #11.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mui nick.
Mr. Dunn moves for admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit #11.
Mr. Crawford has no objection.
Court admits Plaintiff's Exhibit #11.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Dunn has witness handed Plaintiff's Exhibit #12.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Dunn moves for admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit #12.
Mr. Crawford has no objection.
Court admits Plaintiff's Exhibit #12.
Mr. Dunn has witness handed Plaintiff's Exhibit #13.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination.
Mr. Crawford objects.
Mr. Dunn addresses Court.
Mr. Crawford withdraws his objection.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Crawford objects--record speaks for itself.
Court--sustained.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examintion of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Crawford objects--foundation.
Court has Mr. Dunn re-phrase the question.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Crawford obects--foundation.
Court--overruled.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Dunn has witness handed Plaintiff's Exhibit #14.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Crawford moves for admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit #13, #14.
Mr. Dunn requests side bar--outside presence of jury.
Court has the jury leave the courtroom.

COURT MINUTES

2
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095132
095215
#13 and
09554 7
095614
095636
095724
0957 40
095840
095918
100005
100236
102143
102200
102242
102541
102557
102610
102625
102658
102716
102728
102822
102908
102916
102925
102945
105013
105018
105024
105109
105123
105140
105230
105317
110328
110458
110506
110513
110519
110559
110609
110631
010632
010640
011016
011103

Court reviews matter.
Mr. Dunn addresses Court re: Mr. Crawford moving for admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit
#14.
Mr. Dunn does not object to their admission for all purposes.
Court admits Plaintiff's Exhibits #13 and #14.
Mr. Crawford addresses Court on chiropractic records re: some words about insurance.
Court--social security numbers also.
Court admits Plaintiff's Exhibits #9 and #10 subject to revisions.
Bailiff brings jury into the courtroom, all present.
Court addresses jury re: Plfs Exhibits #13, #14, #9, #10.
Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dr. Mui nick.
Mr. Crawford begins cross examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Dunn objects.
Dr. Mulnick continues.
Mr. Crawford continues direct examination.
Mr. Dunn--there's nothing in evidence as to the NiMiiPuu records.
Court questions Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Crawford responds.
Court tells Mr. Crawford to show him the records.
Mr. Crawford continues cross examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Dunn moves to strike any reference to NiMiiPuu records.
Court addresses Mr. Dunn. Court denies that request.
Mr. Dunn begins re-direct examination of Dr. Mulnick.
Mr. Crawford has no re-cross examination.
Witness excused.
Court takes morning recess--admonished jury.
Recess
Court back in session.
Court has Ms. Blackeagle re-take the witness stand.
Bailiff brings the jury into the courtroom, all present.
Court addresses jury.
Mr. Dunn indicates he had finished his direct examination.
Mr. Crawford begins cross examination of Robin Blackeagle.
Mr. Crawford has Ms. Blackeagle's deposition published.
Mr. Crawford continues cross examination of Robin Blackeagle.
Mr. Dunn begins re-direct examination of Robin Blackeagle.
Mr. Crawford objects--outside the scope.
Court will allow the question.
Ms. Dunn states that he is finished.
Mr. Crawford has no re-cross examination.
Mr. Dunn has a witness that is not here yet. Court may want to take a lunch break.
Court addresses the jury. Court to take lunch recess and resume at 1:00 p.m.
Recess
Court back in session--all parties present and ready to proceed.
Court addresses counsel re: jury instructions and redaction on some exhibits.
Bailiff brings jury into the courtroom, all present.
Court addresses jurors.

COURT MINUTES

3
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011150 Mr. Dunn calls Charles Weddle, sworn by clerk.
011226 Mr. Dunn begins direct examination of Charles Weddle.
011638 Mr. Crawford objects--opinion.
011643 Court--we're to the point of unresponsive.
011650 Mr. Dunn moves on and continues direct examination of Charles Weddle.
011830 Mr. Crawford--no cross examination.
011837 Mr. Crawford requests side bar--counsels approach bench.
011930 Witness excused.
011950 Mr. Dunn calls Dana McCandless, sworn by clerk.
012038 Mr. Dunn begins direct examination of Dana McCandless.
012314 Mr. Dunn has drawing on easel marked Plaintiff's Exhibit #8 (illustrative).
012320 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination.
012942 Mr. Dunn moves for admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit #8.(illustrative only)
012949 Mr. Crawford has no objection.
012952 Court admits Plaintiff's Exhibit #8 for illustrative purposes.
012955 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dana McCandless.
013334 Mr. Dunn has witness handed Plaintiff's Exhibit #17.
013418 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination.
013857 Mr. Dunn moves for admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit #17.
013901 Mr. Crawford has no objection.
013908 Court admits Plaintiff's Exhibit #17.
013911 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dana McCandless.
015304 Mr. Crawford objects--foundation.
015325 Court overrules objection and directs the witness to answer yes or no.
015332 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination.
015525 Mr. Crawford objects. He asked for this and never received it.
015529 Mr. Dunn refers to deposition pages 43 & 44.
015725 Mr. Dunn corrects himself--page 49.
015809 Mr. Dunn addresses Court.
015813 Mr. Crawford addresses Court.
015822 Mr. Dunn addresses Court further.
015836 Court excuses jury from the courtroom. Court takes 15 minutes recess.
021835 Court back in session.
021855 Court addresses issue of interrogatories. Court's understanding Mr. McCandless will
testify to an amount of $5000 for lost income and Mr. Crawford will not have an objection to that.
Correct Mr. Crawford?
021909 Mr. Crawford--correct.
021911 Bailiff brings jury back into the courtroom, all present.
022020 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination of Dana McCandless.
022140 Mr. Crawford begins cross examination of Dana McCandless.
023153 Mr. Dunn begins re-direct examination.
023301 Mr. Crawford objects.
023316 Witness steps down.
023347 Mr. Dunn addresses Court. No more witnesses subject to the issue with the IME Dr.
previously talked about.
023402 Court has counsel approach bench.
023556 Mr. Crawford calls Mr. Pease to the stand, previously sworn.
COURT MINUTES

4
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023708 Mr. Crawford begins direct examination of Mr. Pease.
023818 Mr. Dunn has no cross examination.
023825 Witness steps down.
023914 Mr. Crawford indicates defense rests.
023929 Mr. Dunn calls Dana McCandless as a rebuttal witness, previously sworn.
023952 Mr. Dunn begins direct examination.
024013 Mr. Crawford objects--this is not rebuttal.
024026 Mr. Dunn addresses Court.
024055 Court overrules objection.
024103 Mr. Dunn continues direct examination.
024152 Mr. Crawford objects--foundation.
024225 Mr. Dunn says he will ask a better question. He continues direct examination.
024320 Mr. Crawford has no questions for Mr. McCandless.
024325 Witness steps down.
024338 Counsels indicate no other rebuttal argument.
024352 Court addresses jury re: jury instructions. Court has to do regular criminal calendar
tomorrow morning. We will reconvene tomorrow afternoon at 1:00 p.m. Court admonishes jury.
024529 Court in excuses jury until December 19th at 1:00 p.m.
025729 Court back in session. Court addresses issue brought up at the final pretrial about
calling the IME doctor previously identified by the defendant as an expert. Mr. Crawford filed a
motion in limine and Mr. Dunn responded. After conclusion of evidence, Mr. Crawford made the
decision that he will not be calling the IME doctor as part of the defense case in this matter.
025914 Mr. Crawford addresses Court.
025930 Mr. Dunn addresses Court. He attempted to find out the cost of the IME doctor through
their office. He did not ever speak to the expert, but wanted to bring them in for issues of
causation. Should have been allowed to subpoena this doctor but were not afforded that
opportunity.
030135 Mr. Crawford addresses Court. No power to order a doctor from Washington to show
up. They never identified her as an expert. They have no right to call her. Dr. Mulnick
concurred with her report, so it's done.
030232 Court addresses Mr. Dunn. Whether that witness is called is determined by the
defense and it's not a circumstance the Court can remedy. The motion in limine is moot at this
time. That's the conclusion of the evidence that is going to be presented to this jury. Court will
proceed tomorrow afternoon with instructions and closing arguments.
030408 Recess

Hearing End Time:

COURT MINUTES

5
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Patty 0. Wbeb
Clerk of the Diatrict Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I S ~ ~ PER
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF N

DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL,
R. BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)

)
V.

MAX E. PEASE, and JOHN DOES 1-5,

Defendants.

CASE NO. CVB-1332

SPECIAL VERDICT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
1. Was the defendant, Max Pease, negligent in the motor vehicle collision?
_ ·__,·
·x"---'·_ ·

_yes.

- - - - no.
2. Was Brent Weddle negligent in the motor vehicle collision?

_ __.X__ yes.
- - - - no.
If you answer both Questions No. I and No. 2 "no" , you are done. Sign and date the

verdict form as instructed and advise the bailiff. If you answer either Question No. 1 or No.
2 "yes", proceed to Question No. 3.
3.

What is the percentage ofnegligence which equals 100%?

2 2 ~o Max Pease
of..5 Jo Brent Weddle
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Total 100%

4. Was there property damage to the plaintiffs' vehicle which was proximately
caused by the collision?

_ _._x__ yes.
- - - - no.
5.

If your answer to 4 above is yes, what is the sum of money that would
compensate the plaintiffs for the property damage?
$

#1~ 500

6. Were there monetary damages for actual expenses as a result of injuries to the
plaintiffs proximately caused by the collision?
_ _x~_yes.
- - - - no.

7. If your answer to 6 above is yes, what is the sum of money that would
compensate the plaintiffs for the actual expenses?

t9

Dana McCandless

$

Robin Blackeagle

$ /OJ

~t>

,a tJ IJ

8. Were there general damages which have been defined in these instructions viz.

pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment, etc. as a result of injuries
to the plaintiffs proximately caused by the collision?
-~><'~_yes.

- - - - no.
9. If your answer to 8 above is yes, what is the sum of money that would
compensate the plaintiffs for the general damages?
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Dana McCandless

$

~IIJO

Robin Blackeagle

$

I.ho
>

Juror

&fwv.

Juror

~

Juror

t2,~ -(2oQw.rn8LJ

rn

2

Juror

Juror

You should now sign and date the verdict form appropriately and notify the Bailiff you have
reached a verdict.
Dated this _ _ day of December 2018.
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Filed: February 08, 2019 at 8:58 AM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
By: J e-t'\.¥\.Y

LCfA!Uirl.Mt' Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Dana R McCandless, Mabel Robin Blackeagle
vs.
Max E Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle

Case No. CV-2013-1332

JUDGE: Brudie, Jeff M.

DATE:December19,2018

CLERK: Jenny Landrus

LOCATION: Courtroom 1
COURT REPORTER: Linda Carlton

HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial

Parties Present:
Blackeagle, Mabel Robin
Crawford, John Nick
Dunn, Robin Dwain
McCandless, Dana R
Pease, Max E

Court Minutes

Plaintiff
Attorney of
Record--Def
Attorney of
Record--Plf
Plaintiff
Defendant

Hearing Start Time: 1 :00 PM
Journal Entries:
010403 Mr. Dunn present with plaintiffs. Mr. Crawford present with defendant.
010414 Court in session. Evidence was concluded yesterday then Court and counsl held jury
instruction conference.
010450 Mr. Dunn addresses Court re: jury instructions.
010532 Court--that's Instruction #5.
010540 Mr. Dunn addresses Court further re: you could be negligent and not cause something
to happen. He wants to add to Instruction #5 that defendant has burden of proof that defendant
was negligent and caused damage.
010630 Court overrules objection and will go with Instruction #5 as drafted.
010705 Mr. Dunn addresses Court re: issue of interest is a factual question.
010749 Court addresses Mr. Dunn. Court overrules objection.
010830 Mr. Crawford addresses Court as to Instruction #9 and #12.
010942 Court addresses counsel.
010948 Mr. Dunn addresses Court.
011023 Court addresses his law clerk.
011042 Mr. Crawford addresses Court.
011055 Court and counsel discuss future earnings.
011134 Court overrules the objection.
011158 Bailiff brings the jury into the courtroom, all present.
011250 Court addresses jury.
011326 Court begins reading the closing jury instructions.
013255 Mr. Dunn begins closing argument.
COURT MINUTES

1
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014309 Mr. Crawford moves to strike what Mr. Dunn has written on paper on easel.
014324 Mr. Dunn addresses Court.
014334 Court instructs Mr. Dunn to go to the next page on the easel.
014339 Mr. Dunn continues closing argument.
015437 Mr. Crawford begins closing argument.
015503 Mr. Dunn objects. This isn't evidence.
015512 Court sustains objection.
015515 Mr. Crawford continues closing argument.
021535 Mr. Dunn objects--testifying.
021550 Court overrules objection.
021553 Mr. Crawford continues closing argument.
022045 Mr. Dunn presents rebuttal closing argument.
022450 Mr. Crawford objects. He's talking about the ruling on evidence.
022504 Court sustains objection.
022516 Mr. Dunn continues rebuttal closing argument.
-Juror needs brief break to use the restroom023345 Mr. Dunn continues rebuttal closing.
023501 Mr. Crawford objects--speculation.
023512 Court overrules objection.
023518 Mr. Dunn continues rebuttal closing argument.
023755 Court addresses jury.
023804 Clerk draws the alternate juror, Michael Best.
023845 Court addresses jury.
023859 Clerk administers oath to the bailiff.
023935 Court excuses jury to begin deliberations.
023958 Court in recess at 2:40 p.m.
053358 Court back in session at 5:34 p.m.
053410 Bailiff indicates to Court the jury has reached a verdict.
053416 Bailiff brings jury into the courtoom, all present.
053502 Court addresses presiding juror Barbara Potts and she relays they reached a verdict.
053513 Presiding juror hands the verdict to the bailiff, who then hands it to the Court.
053550 Court reads the verdict signed by 11 jurors.
0537 44 Court has jury nod their head in the affirmative if this is their verdict.
053756 Mr. Dunn does not wish to have the jury polled.
053758 Mr. Crawford does not wish to have the jury polled.
053809 Court instructs clerk to enter he jury's verdict.
053825 Court addresses the jury.
054156 Court reads the final jury instruction.
054259 Court excuses jury from the courtroom.
05434 7 Court instructs Mr. Dunn to prepare the Judgment in accordance with the verdict. Let
Mr. Crawford review the proposed Judgment before sending it to the Court.
054440 Court will have clerk make copies of the verdict for counsel.
054449 Recess
Hearing End Time: 10:00 PM

COURT MINUTES

2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DANA R. MCCANDLESS and
MABEL ROBIN BLACKEAGLE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

MAX E. PEASE, et. al.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-13-1332
INSTRUCTIONS SUBMITTED
TO THE JURY

The attached instructions No. 1 through No. 21 were given to the jury this 19th day of
December, 2018.
DATED this 2,,,(:) day of December, 2018.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1
These instructions define your duties as members of the jury and the law that applies to
this case. Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow these instructions.
You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. Neither
sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you
of these duties is vital to the administration of justice.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law.
Except as explained in these instructions, none of my rulings were intended by me to indicate
any opinion concerning the evidence in this case.
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys were intended to help you understand the
evidence and the instructions, but they were not themselves evidence. If any argument or remark
had no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard it.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2
The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before you. As the
sole judges of the facts, you must determine which of the witnesses you believe, what portion of
their testimony you accept, and what weight you attach to it. At times during the trial, I may
have sustained objections to questions asked without permitting the witness to answer, or, where
an answer was given, I may have instructed that it be stricken from the record and that you
disregard it and dismiss it from your minds. You should not draw any inference from any
unanswered question; nor should you consider testimony that was stricken, in reaching your
decision. Such items were excluded because they were not legally admissible in a trial. In
reaching your decision, you may not consider such a question, answer or exhibit or speculate as
to what the answer or exhibit would have shown.
The law does not, however, require you to accept all of the evidence that was admitted.
In determining what evidence you will accept, you must make your own evaluation of the
evidence and determine the degree of weight you choose to give to that evidence.
The testimony of a witness may have failed to conform to the facts as they were
presented because the witness did not accurately see or hear that about which the witness
testified, or because the recollection of the event was faulty, or because the witness did not
express himself clearly in giving his testimony. There is no magic formula by which one may
evaluate testimony. You bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background
of your lives. In your everyday affairs you determine for yourselves the reliability or
unreliability of statements made to you by others. The same considerations that you use in your
everyday dealings are the considerations that you should apply in your deliberations.
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In evaluating the testimony of the witnesses, you should consider the interest or lack of
interest of any witness in the outcome of this case; the bias or prejudice of a witness, if there be
any; the opportunity that the witness had to observe the facts concerning which he or she
testified; the probability or improbability of the witness's testimony when viewed in the light of
all the other evidence in the case; the contradiction, if any, of a witness's testimony by other
evidence; statements, if any, made by the witness at other times inconsistent with his present
testimony; and any evidence presented regarding a witness's general reputation for truthfulness,
honesty or integrity.
In evaluating the exhibits, you should consider such items as the circumstances under
which the exhibit was prepared and the probability that the exhibit accurately reflects what it is
intended to show in light of the other evidence of the case.
These considerations are among those that may or may not make it appear that there is a
discrepancy in the evidence. You may consider whether the apparent discrepancy can be
reconciled by fitting the two stories together. If, however, that is not possible, you will then have
to determine which of the conflicting versions you will accept.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3
Any party who asserts that certain facts exist or existed has the burden of proving those
facts. When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if you
find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true
than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4
The plaintiffs have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. The defendant, Max Pease, drove his motor vehicle in a negligent manner.
2. The collision that occurred was a proximate cause of the injuries and property damage to the
plaintiffs
3. The amount of money that should be awarded to the plaintiffs for the damages to the
plaintiffs for injuries and for property damage to the vehicle.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5
The defendant has the burden of proof to prove that Brent Weddle was negligent.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the
evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful
person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably
careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or probable
sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the damage would
not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage
likely would have occurred anyway.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8
When I use the term "value" or the phrase "fair market value" or "actual cash value" in
these instructions as to any item of property, I mean the amount of money that a willing buyer
would pay and a willing seller would accept for the item in question in an open marketplace, in the
item's condition as it existed immediately prior to the occurrence in question.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9
Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a male age 58 is 81 years. Under
a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a female age 41 is 82 years. This figure is not
conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length of life based upon
statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This data may be considered in
connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy, including the subject's
occupation, health, habits, and other activities.
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INSTRUCTIONNO. 10
A person who has a pre-existing condition or disability is entitled to recover damages for the
aggravation of such preexisting condition, if any, that is proximately caused by the occurrence. The
person is not entitled to recover damages for the pre-existing condition or disability itself.
If you find that before the occurrence causing the injuries in this case the plaintiff Robin

Blackeagle had a preexisting bodily condition or disability, and further find that because of the new
occurrence in this case the pre-existing condition or disability was aggravated, then you should
consider the aggravation of the condition or disability in fixing the damages in this case. You
should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the occurrence, or any
aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by reason of this occurrence.
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition or disability prior to this occurrence
and the condition or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability accordingly. If no
apportionment can reasonably be made by you, then the defendant is liable for the entire damage.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11
It was the duty of the defendant, before and at the time of the occurrence, to use ordinary
care for the safety of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' property.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12
Whether or not a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13
If the jury decides the plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the defendant,

the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate the plaintiffs for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A. Non-economic damages
1.

The nature of the injuries;

2.

The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;

3.

Loss of enjoyment of life;

4.

mconvemence;

5.

The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition of Robin

.

.

Blackeagle
B. Economic damages
1.

The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and

expenses incurred as a result of the injury;
2.

The reasonable value of the past earnings lost as a result of the

3.

The value of any property damages sustained by the plaintiffs.

lllJury;

Whether the plaintiffs have proven any of these elements is for the jury to decide.
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INSTRUCTIONNO. 14
In instructing you on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to whether
the Plaintiffs are, or are not, entitled to damages.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-fourths of
the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to it.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must
decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with
your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views
and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction
as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the
mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.
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INSTRUCTIONNO. 16
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to be
awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average the sum
of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage award or
percentage of negligence.

Page 184

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a

note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me by
any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of the
questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence,
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict.
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict
form to you now.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for your
deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the attitude
and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important.

At the outset of

deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of
pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is
wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me,
there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you
must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of
the case with your fellow jurors.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over
your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the

directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions on
the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine
or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you should fill
it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on each question.
If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who will
then return you into open court.
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Electronically Filed
1/2/2019 11:35 AM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Amber Allen, Deputy Clerk

DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. 0. Box277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DANA R. McCANDLESS and,
MABEL ROBIN BLACKEAGLE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
MAX E. PEASE, ET AL.,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

Case No. CV-13-01332
AFFIDAVIT /DECLARATION OF
ROBIN D. DUNN, ESQ.
I.R.C.P. 2.7; 56(e); I.C. § 9-1406

)
ss.
)

ROBIN D. DUNN, declares and states under oath the following:
1.

He is over the age of 18, is competent to testify; has personal knowledge of
the matters contained herein; is competent to testify; and, voluntarily makes the
statements in this document.

2.

I am a licensed attorney in the State of Idaho and have been licensed to
practice since the Autumn of 1982 to the present. I am the attorney for the
plaintiffs in this matter and handled the jury trial before the above-entitled court
commencing on December 17, 2018 and concluding on December 19, 2018.

3.

A proposed Judgment has been prepared and being reviewed by the attorney
for the defendant. The proposed judgment has not yet been submitted to the
court for review and approval.

4.

The undersigned has filed a Motion for a New Trial. This
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affidavit/ declaration is being filed in support of the motion to correspond to the
provisions ofI.R.C.P. 59.
I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(l)(A)(C)
1.

No defense was presented by the defendant on any of the evidence presented

by the plaintiffs. Cross-examination occurred by the defendant's counsel of the
plaintiff witnesses. The defendant, Max Pease, took the stand in defense and
answered two questions unrelated to any issues before the jury. No other witnesses
testified in the defendant's case-in-chief.
2. No experts were presented to contest any of the special damages which included
property damage, health care expenses, lost income; and, general damages of pain
and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and those matters covered as general damages
by court instruction 13.
2.

Brent Weddle was found by the jury to be 25% negligent wherein no evidence

was presented except cross-examination. No actual defense was tendered in direct
by defendant, Max Pease. Max Pease was elderly and had to be lifted into the
witness chair. This factor can only explain the bias of the jury for the elderly man.
His cross examination in the plaintiffs' case-in-chief showed he claimed
responsibility on three separate occasions. First, his statement to the police, Exhibit
4 of the plaintiff, shows he states that he should be " Be More Alert". His deposition
testimony stated: "15-20 seconds behind Weddle" This statement was put before the
jury from page 15 of his deposition wherein he was questioned.

His discovery

answer to Interrogatory 13 shows he stated Weddle was "100 yards in front." This
statement was also presented to the jury. Yet at trial 7 .5 years later he tried to explain
away all of these statements when such statements were in preparation for trial. The
jury had to be acting with passion or prejudice.
3.

The closing arguments of counsel were not considered evidence and the court

so instructed in jury instruction no. 1.
2
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4.

The jury verdict is an impossibility because the jury used monetary numbers

which were totally devoid in the evidence presented and were totally unrebutted by
the defendant in any manner.
5.

Also, defense counsel argued that the $5,000.00 roofing income was not

disclosed. It is clearly in the deposition testimony attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by reference. The objection, which was improper, had an actual
bias upon the jury because the jury ignored this evidence. The objection was not
explainable but was influential to the jury because this dollar sum was ignored.
6.

Defense counsel argued to the jury: "We usually award two times the

medicals for general damages." Who is ''we". Clearly, the jury did not even reach
this sum in general damages and had to be influenced by outside considerations.
7. Brent Weddle was made whole by the defendant. How could he be considered
negligent?
I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(l)(F)
1.

The unrebutted testimony of the plaintiff was property damage to Dodge 250

Truck was $35,000.00 as of the date of the collision. (7.5 years prior to trial). The
extra add-ons to the motor vehicle were testified to being $11,000.00 to $14,000.00.
The lowest possible figure the jury could consider was $46,000.00. No other
testimony existed in the trial exhibits, the trial testimony or even by way of argument.
The jury awarded $15,500.00. This sum would have to come from a totally
speculative source as no other evidence existed. It is impossible, from the evidence
and even from the arguments to come to any other result. $15,500.00 is blatant error
by the jury.
2.

Actual expenses included medical/health care billings. Any addition by

mathematics of the actual billings was not possible for the jury to reach this result.
Dana McCandless was awarded $4,900.00. His hospital and chiropractic care
exceeded that sum. The IME introduced into evidence indicated the medical
3
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treatment was fair and reasonable and more likely than not to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty. No evidence rebutted that presumption. Plus, there are no
billings that match the sum awarded by the jury.
The medical expenses for Robin Blackeagle were awarded at $10,200.00. This
figure does not match any of the medical/health care billings placed before the jury.
The jury numbers on medical/health care billings are impossibility from the
evidence and documents presented. Furthermore, the exactness of the numbers
shows the jury had to conclude said sums from a source other than the actual
billings. (Note: The jury did not have plaintiffs exhibits 15 and 16 which, according
to memory were stipulated to introduction by the parties.) These exhibits completed
all additions in mathematical format for the jury; and, set forth all health care costs
claimed. Regardless, the medical billings were before the jury and had been
"cleaned" to remove any reference to insurance. As such, the result reached, which
was not rebutted, could not be a possibility.
Finally, the plaintiffs testified to lost wages of $5,000.00 for fishing and taking
said fish to the local summer markets. The second loss of wages was for a roofing
job that was set at $25.00 per hour not to exceed 200 hours for a total of $5,000.00.
The total lost wages was $10,000.00. There is no rebuttal evidence on this point. The
jury simply ignored this evidence.
Also, defense counsel argued that the $5,000.00 roofing income was not
disclosed. It is clearly in the deposition testimony attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by reference. The objection, which was improper, had an actual
bias upon the jury because the jury ignored this evidence. The objection was not
explainable but was influential and prejudicial to the jury because this dollar sum
was ignored.
I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(1)(G)
1.

No evidence exists in the record to justify property damage of
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$15,500.00. That number has never been mentioned by anyone. A jury would have to
use its own numbers to come to such a result.
2.

No health care billings would allow the jury to reach numbers of

$4,900.00 for McCandless and $10,200.00 for Blackeagle. Those numbers simply do
not exist in the record. A jury would have to use its own numbers to come to such a
result.
3.

No sum was ever mentioned for lost income. The jury found no such

number. The lost income was not rebutted or explained away by anyone. A jury
would have to exclude these numbers to come to such a result. Emotion or inflamed
ju1y is the only possible result.
4. General damages are discretionary. But it appears the small sums were as
the result of passion or prejudice. The defendant was an elderly man that had to be
lifted into the witness chair. Only, emotion could explain the potential sympathy for
this defendant.
I.R.C.P. Rule 59(d)(2)
The court can consider other factors not in the motion as outlined by Rule 59,
I.R.C.P. Those factors may include the following:
1.

The collision occurred on the reservation of the Nez Pearce tribe.

2.

The plaintiff, Robin Blackeagle was Nez Pearce. No NativeAmericans were on the jury.

3.

The defendant was unable to properly ambulate. He was lifted into
the witness chair.

4.

Brent Weddle was made whole by the defendant. How could Weddle
be considered negligent.

5.

Defense counsel used innuendo and insinuation that the plaintiffs
were only greedy people. Yet Charles Weddle, owner of the Toyota,
testified McCandless evasive action prevented a head on collision with the
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Toyota.
6.

McCandless testified he saw Weddle do nothing improper.

These factors are believed to have inflamed or caused emotional decisions by
the jury not supported by fact, The jury was influenced by some measure
other than factual or documentary evidence.
7.

Dr. McCormick, the IME expert, was to appear on Thursday to testify
for the defense. Her subpoena was cancelled. Plaintiffs' counsel knew
this may occur. For over one month prior to trial, offers were made to pay
her fees to attend. Counsel refused any contact of their "expert" to
subpoena. Then at trial, the defense indicated the court could not allow a
subpoena to an out-of-state expert. Yet the plaintiffs were forced to be
examined out-of- state by this expert. The plaintiffs had no choice.
Important questions could have been asked of this witness. The plaintiffs
were denied due process. This matter was discussed at the pretrial
conference. A motion in limine was propounded with a response from the
plaintiffs. The same was never heard.

I certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State ofldaho that
the foregoing is true and correct. I.C. § 9-1406.

DATED,w,.:l"°d,yo<J="'Y,~

Robin D. Dunn
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of January, 2019.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day ofJ anuary, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by thee-file system ofI-court:
DOCUMENT SERVED:

REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING

ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED:

J. Nick Crawford, Esq.
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701
jnc@brassey.net

() Facsimile - 208-344-7077
( ) U.S. Mail
( ) Courthouse Box

Nez Perce Courthouse: Hon. Judge Brudie
(Fax: 208.709-3070)

~
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I
2

Q.
A.

Q.

3
4

A.

5

Q.

6
7
8

9

IO
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I
2

3
4
5

A.
gauge.
Q.
How has the water foul hunting been the
last few years?
A.
Not very good. Haven't gone much in the
last few years.
Q.
Is it because lack of birds or just not
going?
A.
Just -- well, we see a lot of geese in
Kamiah right in town. Ifwe could hunt there, we'd do
good.
Q.
Exactly. If! could shoot them in my
front yard, I would.
A.
They got 'em down there, too.
Q.
Any other activities that you still do? I
mean, what kind of things do you like to do for fun that
you still do?
A.
Just general? Or -Q.
Yeah.
A.
I really like to fish.

6

7
8
9

10

11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

just after the accident, and I wasn't feeling up to it.
Q. Had you made arrangements to do it before
the accident?
A.
Yeah. They're friends of mine. I told
them I'd help them out and work with him and charge them
$25 an hour.
Q. How much do you think you lost as a result
of not doing that job?
A.
Well, I told him that the total job would
take 200 hours or less. So I put a limit on it when I
told him how much I'd do it for.
Q.
And the 200 hours, that would be your 200
hours?
A. Yeah. Contingent upon him helping me do
the job.
Q. So I understand, would that be 200 hours
total? Or his time plus your 200 hours?
A.
Just not to exceed 200 hours. So the
max -- like ifit went over 200 hours, he would only get
billed for 200 hours.
Q.
Okay. Have you ever, since the accident,
been on Unemployment or anything like that?
A.
No. Never in my life.
Q.
And how long have you been with the
casino?
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I
2
3
4

5
6
7
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24
25

Q.

Okay. Do you do that a lot?
When I get a chance, yeah.
Q. What kind of hours do you wmk nowadays?
A.
As far as -- we work I 0-hour shifts.
Q. Four !Os?
A.
Well, I'm on an on-call status, so I
basically get whenever somebod y doesn't come in, I get
called in.
Q.
Okay.
A.
So I can work all different shifts.
Q.
No set time?
A.
No.
Q.
Okay. Did you lose any wages as a result
of the accident?
A.
I had aroofing job that I potentially
could have got.
Q. Who was that with?
A.
It was for Dale and Jan Belieu.
Q.
Belieu?
A.
Yeah. B-e-1-i-e-u.
Q.
Okay. Are they in Grangeville?
A.
Craigmont.
Q.
So what happened there?
A.
They needed the work done, so they hired
somebody else. I couldn't do it at the time. It was
A.

I
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Have you taken a shot at it?
No.
What kind of gun do you use?
Seven millimeter, nine millimeter.
Water fowl, 12 gauge?
I have a 12 gauge, a 16 gauge and a JO

l
I
l

1
't

l

j

- - - - - - - - - - - - , ,!
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1
A.
Since February of last year.
2
Q.
Oh, you told me that. I'm sor1y. I
3 apologize. Any other work since the accident?
4
A.
Well, we fish together, me and my wife.
5
Q. Okay. Oh, explain that to me. I know I'm
6 going to ask her about that, but explain. Explain that
7 tome.
8
A.
Well, she has a treaty right to fish, so
9 she catches the fish, I process them, smoke them, and we
IO sell them at the McCall farmers market. And we've been
11 doing that since '09, I think. Possibly '08.
12
Q. Is it all smoked?
13
A.
No. Some ofit's filleted and the other
14 is smoked.
15
Q. Where do you fish at?
16
A.
Columbia River, Rapid River, Imnaha River.
17 That's over in Oregon.
18
Q.
Okay. Is this -- I mean, is this rod and
19 reel or is it netting?
20
A.
She uses a net. A dip net. Or hoop net,
21 I should say. It's a hoop on the end of a pole.
22
Q. Okay. How often do you guys do that?
23
A.
We've done it eve1y year since 2009. We
24 didn't do it last year.
25
Q.
ls there a particular season?

'I

1

I
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Electronically Filed
1/2/2019 11:35 AM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Amber Allen, Deputy Clerk

DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. 0. Box277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DANA R. McCANDLESS and,
MABEL ROBIN BLACKEAGLE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MAX E. PEASE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-13-01332
MEMORANDUM OF THE
PLAINTIFFS IN SUPPORT OF
NEWTRIAL

COME NOW, the plaintiffs, by and through the undersigned attorney and submit
this Memorandum supporting the plaintiffs request for new trial as follows:
LIABILITY /COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Attorneys perform discovery and collect statements to be better informed of the
merits of the case. Also, these tasks help to know what to expect at trial and to prepare for
the fact-finder.
In the instant case, Max Pease, had given three prior statements of which two were
under oath. The statements are as follows:
-Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4: Pease states he: " Should be more Alert".
-In his deposition he was questioned at trial and agreed that his deposition stated:
"15-20 Seconds behind Weddle", Counsel for plaintiff showed the jury how long 15 seconds
was with a timer from his cell phone.
-In his answers to interrogatories Number 13 he states: " "Weddle was 100 yards in front".
He was questioned on this statement before the jury.
1
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These three admissions should have informed the jury of the non-liability of Weddle,
In addition, McCandless testified of no error by Weddle. Brent Weddle testified of no error
and signal lights working. Charles Weddle testified that defendant, Max Pease took
responsibility of the collision.
The jury went against the great weight of evidence and accepted the testimony of
Pease which was over 7 .5 years later. He disputed and recanted his sworn testimony of prior
years. He was infirmed and old without the memory of his earlier statements.
The jury was obviously under some undue passion or prejudice to make a finding
that Weddle had any negligence in the collision.
DAMAGES
See, Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986);]uarez v. Aardema, 128
Idaho 687, 918 P.2d 271 (1996) Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 200 P.3d 1191 (2008).
Propert;y damage. -The first major obvious error is property damage. There
are no figures in the transcript or any argument that the Blackeagle Dodge 250 was valued at
$15,500.00. The jury had to guess on this figure and had no discretion to ignore the only
unrebutted testimony of McCandless. He testified that the vehicle, at the time of collision,
was worth $35, 000.00 and had add-ons of $11,000 to $14,000.00. This was the only evidence

in the trial. The jury could not deviate from this unrebutted testimony. The lowest possible
figure would be $46,000.00. No other evidence existed.
Medical/health bills, -The medical and health bills were not disputed. The IME of
the defendants' witness which was shown by document but no live testimony substantiated
the medical billings and the care given. The totals given by the jury match no records in
evidence nor do the same match any numbers. The numbers were rounded and could not
possibly be related to the evidence under any interpretation. The chiropractic billings of Dr.
Mulnick were not included. It is unclear if the jury was presented the Plaintiff's Exhibits 15
and 16 which were stipulated to by the parties. After the trial these exhibits were returned to
2
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Lost Wages. -There were no lost wages included despite the disclosure to the
defense counsel who unduly objected and prejudiced the jury as though the plaintiffs hid
something. These documents were clearly provided ant in deposition form. The lost wages
of $10,000.00 were not considered by the jury. There was no evidence to rebut these losses.
There was no cross-examination nor was there any counter-evidence in the lack of defense
of defendant's case-in-chief.
General Damages. - The general damages for pain and suffering along with
inconvenience and those matters set forth in Jury instruction 13 suggest the jury was
inflamed or acting with passion as the general damages are so nominal as to shock the
conscience of the court. See, Dinneen v, Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979).
Other. -The trial was held in Nez Pearce County. Robin Blackeagle had none of her
peers on the jury as she lived on the reservation where the accident occurred. The jury was
not a jury of the plaintiff, Blackeagle's peers. The mention of insurance is prohibited by
Idaho law to protect against uureasonable verdicts. The statement "We usually award two
times the medical billings is a direct reference to insurance by the defense. Yet, the
insurance company placed a man in the witness chair who had to be lifted into the box. The
question should be brought forth to the Idaho Supreme Court whether the current law on
mention of insurance is constitutional when the insurance company is merely hiding behind
a "prop" who knows nothing of what the insurance company did or was doing. This trial
court should make a finding the current law on insurance is unconstitutional. Plaintiff
desires to preserve this issue in the event of appeal and requests the trial court mention the
same.

Mrs. Pease could not testify due to dementia. No supporting evidence is supplied on
behalf of Pease. All other evidence points to the complete 100% negligence of Pease.
Appellate review rests on factors as are considered in the seminal case of Smallwood

v. Dick, 114 Idaho 860, 761 P.2d 1212 (1988). A trial court has discretion in granting a new
trial. Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 840 P.2d 392 (1922). In this case there was no
3
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v. Dick, 114 Idaho 860, 761 P.2d 1212 (1988). A trial court has discretion in granting a new
trial. Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 840 P.2d 392 (1922). In this case there was no
conflicting evidence presented to the jury on the issues of damages. [See also cases such as

Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1970).]
An issue on the "Expert Witness" of the defendants on the IME exists. The
plaintiffs were forced to see this "out-of-state" expert. Yet counsel for the defense contends
it was the defense witness. The attorney suggested that an out-of-state witness could not be
<~

subpoenaed to Idaho. Yet, the defense subjected this witness to the State of Idaho. The
defense relied upon her report. (Dr. McCormick). Plaintiff was not allowed to subpoena this
witness nor contact the staff to pay the fee and subpoena this witness to court. This
manifest injustice hampered the ability to ask such questions as maximum medical
improvement (MMI) or why an orthopedic surgeon has an opinion on eye problems when
McCandless hit the window frame with his eye. Counsel for the defense refused to allow the
costs to be paid by the plaintiffs. This issue was presented by motion in limine which was
never heard by the court. Dr. McCormick was going to be brought to court by plaintiffs.
The defendant thwarted that ability. Plaintiffs were denied due process. (Emphasis
supplied). She was subpoenaed to testify on Thursday by the defense. She was cancelled.
Plaintiffs knew defense counsel would use this tactic and tried to make arrangements to
subpoena and make payment arrangements to ensure her live testimony. This is error in the
process that is not harmless error.
By way of argument and to show the unreasonable verdict the following present
value numbers are provided for comparison to make clear to the court the 7 .5 year lapse in
time. At 12% the present value is the following:
Vehicle: $6,330.00
General damages: $2,4450.00
Medicals: $4,155.00
The jury verdict does not conform to the evidence on the issues of liability and on
4
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damages. It is very clear that the jury could not reach the decisions in the special verdict
form based upon the evidence submitted. No rebuttal or conflicting evidence was presented
on damages.
DATED ,hi, 2•• a.y ofJ~•"Y, 2 0 ~

Robin D. Dunn, Esq. #2903

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of January, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) bye-filing through I-court:
DOCUMENT SERVED:

MEMORANDUM OF THE PLAINTIFF IN SUPPOORT

OF NEW TRIAL
ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED:
J. Nick Crawford, Esq.
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701
jnc@brassey.net

Nez Perce Courthouse:

() Facsimile - 208-344-7077
( ) U.S. Mail
( ) Courthouse Box

A-Hnn.Judge~ -

Robin D. Dunn
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Filed:01/04/2019 10:57:23
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Kough, Janet

DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
477 Pleasant Cow1try Lane
P. 0. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DANA R. McCANDLESS and,
MABEL ROBIN BLACKEAGLE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

MAX E. PEASE,
Defendant.

Case No. CV-13-01332
JUDGMENT

Judgment is rendered as follows:
1.

Max Pease is 75% negligent and Brent Weddle is 25% negligent.

2.

Property damage to plaintiffs is $15,500.00.

3.

Actual expenses to plaintiffs are $4,900.00 to D ana McCandless and $10,200.00
to Robin Blackeagle.

4.

General damages to plaintiffs are $5,000.00 to Dana McCandless and $1,000.00
to Robin Blackeagle.

5.

Total damages to plaintiffs are $36,600.00. $27,450 equals 75% of damages
owed by defendant, Max Pease.

4 day of January, 2019.
DATED this ___

Signed: 1/4/2019 10:46 AM

~ - ]effBrudie
DISTRICT JUDGE
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NOTICE OF ENTRY
Signed: 1/4/2019 10:57 AM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ ~ day of January, 2019, a tnie and correct copy of
the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by thee-file system of I-court:
DOCUMENT SERVED:

JUDGMENT

ATTORNEYS AND /OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED:

J. Nick Crawford, Esq.
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701
jnc@brassey.net

( ) Facsimile - 208-344-7077
( ) U.S. Mail
( ) Courthouse Box
✓

E-Mail

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
i-dunn@dunnlawoffices.com
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Electronically Filed
1/16/2019 2:59 PM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Diane Ash, Deputy Clerk

J. Nick Crawford, ISB 3220
Ryan C. Janis, ISB 9601
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 215
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Email: jnc@brassey.net
icourt@brassey.net
Attorneys for Defendant Max E. Pease

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DANA R. McCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 13-01332
Plaintiffs,
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

vs.
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES
1-5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the above-captioned Defendant Max E. Pease, by and through his counsel
of record, Brassey Crawford, PLLC, and hereby files this Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for New Trial filed under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(A)(C)(F)(G) and Rule
59(1 )(d)(2).

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 1
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I.

BACKGROUND

This litigation has been ongoing for several years and stems from an automobile collision
that occurred on U.S. Highway 12 in Idaho County, Idaho on June 30, 2011 and involved three
separate vehicles, one driven by Defendant Max Pease (hereinafter "Mr. Pease"), one driven by
Brent Weddle (hereinafter "Mr. Weddle") and the third and final vehicle driven by Plaintiff Dana
McCandless with Plaintiff Robin Blackeagle (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs") riding as a
passenger. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on June 27, 2013 initiating the litigation in this matter.
After the litigation proceeded for a few years, Defendant eventually believed that they had resolved
this matter by way of settlement in 2016, for an agreed cumulative amount of $45,000 but as
Plaintiffs ended up disputing that belief Defendant filed a motion to enforce the settlement with
the Court. See Defendant~ Motion to Enforce Settlement, Memorandum in Support and Affidavit

of Counsel in Support filed on or about December 6, 2016. Ultimately, Plaintiffs opposed that
motion and requested that this matter be put back on the Court's trial calendar, which the Court
agreed to do and reset trial to commence on December 17 and proceed through December 21,
2018.
This matter was eventually tried before a jury of twelve (12) empaneled from a pool of Nez
Perce County citizens. The trial commenced as scheduled on Monday, December 17 and concluded
on Wednesday, December 19 when the jury began deliberations. The witnesses who took the stand
during the trial included: Max Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle, Dana McCandless, Mabel
Robin Blackeagle, and chiropractor Irwin Mulnick. The entire jury was present during all
testimony, and there is no reason to believe they jury was not listening or paying attention during
the course of the trial. After deliberations, the jury reached a verdict that 75% of the responsibility
for the accident was attributable to Mr. Pease and 25% of the responsibility attributable to Mr.
Weddle. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, as the Court is aware there was certainly testimony and
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 2
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evidence presented at trial that indicated Mr. Weddle could be determined to have been partially
at fault for the accident, including but not limited to Mr. Pease's testimony. Mr. Pease's testimony
is valid competent evidence which Plaintiffs cannot ignore. Certainly the jury did not.
Plaintiffs claim that Charles Weddle testified that Mr. Pease "took responsibility for the
collision" but it must be noted that the testimony Plaintiff is apparently referring to was with regard
to Mr. Pease's insurance provider paying for the damage to his vehicle. Defendant hereby formally
objects to that assertion by Plaintiffs and to any further consideration of that evidence as it is
expressly prohibited pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 411. Determinations as to liability are
expressly the responsibility of the jury, and as there was unquestionably evidence introduced at
trial from which the jury could reach its ultimate conclusion, there is no basis to disturb its findings.
Moreover, as Plaintiffs argument to the contrary is based on a statement that entirely revolves
around liability insurance paying for damage to his vehicle, and is attempting to use that evidence
to demonstrate that fault should rest entirely with Mr. Pease (in contradiction to the jury's findings)
that assertion should not be considered by the Court in making its determination on Plaintiffs'
Motion. Moreover, Weddle' s testimony that Mr. Pease "took responsibility" is, at best, ambiguous.
It certainly is not sufficient to nullify Mr. Pease's direct testimony.

In terms of damages, the jury awarded $9,900 to Mr. McCandless with $4,900 in special
damages and $5,000 in general damages, and $15,500 for the property damage to his 2005 Dodge
Ram. The jury also awarded $11,200 to Ms. Blackeagle with $10,200 in special damages and
$1,000 in general damages. On January 2, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial under
Rules 59(A)(C)(F)(G) and Rule 59(1 )(d)(2). It must be noted that there was nothing irregular about
the proceedings and they were conducted appropriately pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, Idaho Rules of Evidence and generally under Idaho law. There was nothing improper
about jury selection, and Plaintiffs assertion that there was some improper use of preemptory
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 3
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strikes based on Ms. Blackeagles' s native American heritage is simply not fair and not based in
fact.
II.

A.

AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial Should be Denied because Nothing Indicates the
Jury's Verdict was Rendered Based on Anything Other than the Evidence Presented.

Plaintiffs apparently contend that the verdict rendered by the jury in this case indicates the
influence of passion or prejudice as the award did not include damages for Plaintiffs alleged noneconomic losses. Plaintiffs move for a new trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
59(a)(l)(A), (a)(l)(C), (a)(l)(F), and (a)(l)(G), which state that a new trial may be granted ifthere
1s:
(A)
irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party;
misconduct of the jury;
(C)
(F)
excessive damages are inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice;
(G)
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that is
against the law[.]
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l)(A)(C)(F)(G). Plaintiffs also cite to Rule 59 (l)(d)(2), which states that the trial
court may "grant a motion for a new trial, timely served, for reasons not stated in the motion."
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l)(d)(2). The case law for guiding a District Court's decision on a Motion for New
Trial is well established as are the applicable standards for analysis. In Schaefer v. Ready, 134
Idaho 378, 3 P.3d 56 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
When the trial court finds that the amount of damages awarded appears to have been given
under the influence of prejudice or passion, a new trial or additur is the proper course of
action under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 615, 733 P.2d 1234, 1240
(1986). The trial court is to refrain from substituting its view for that of the jury, but is
instructed to examine the disparity between its own judgment and that of the jury and
determine if it shocks the conscious of the Court. Id. This is subjective analysis based on
the trial court's evaluation of the inadequacy or excessiveness of the jury's award. Pratton
v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 852, 840 P.2d 392, 396 (1992). Therefore, the necessary degree
of disparity differs with the facts of each case and with the trial court's sense of fairness
and justice. Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556,558,961 P.2d 647,649 (1998).

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 4
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Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378, 3 P.3d 56 (Ct. App. 2000).

Plaintiffs have made several arguments in their brief attempting to argue that the Court
should overturn the jury's verdict in this matter. For the reasons set forth herein, as well as those
articulated in the affidavit of Counsel filed contemporaneously here with, Plaintiffs' Motion should
be denied.
a. Plaintiffs' Argument re: Property Damage
The determination of damages is within the province of the jury. However, the trial court
has the responsibility to weigh the evidence and make a determination whether the evidence
supports the verdict. See Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575, 578 (1979). Under this
analysis, if "in the trial judge's determination his or her award differs so substantially from the
jury's award that the difference can only be explained because of unjust behavior, a new trial or
additur should be granted." Collins, 131 Idaho at 558, 961 P.2d at 649 (emphasis added).
In this case, the Court should determine that the verdict was arrived at by the jury based on
the evidence presented to it, and that it certainly cannot be only described as a result of unjust
behavior. Plaintiffs claim that the award for Plaintiffs' property damage claim is "obvious error" is
simply untrue, because a jury may choose to accept or reject any testimony provided at the time of
trial, particularly testimony from the owner of the vehicle who would unquestionably have
motivation to exaggerate, or argue for, the highest value possible for his vehicle. The jury is not
only expected to weigh evidence, and make determinations as to credibility, but also to bring in its
common sense and sense of "fairness and justice" while making its decision, within the confines
of the law, and there is nothing to indicate the jury did anything other than make a determination
within the confines of the law that they believed was fair and just. See Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho
759,769,727 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1986) ("since it is a jury function to set the damage award based
on its sense of fairness and justice, the trial judge must defer to the jury, unless it is apparent to the
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 5

Page 209

trial judge that there is a great disparity between the two damage awards and that disparity cannot
be explained away as simply the product of two separate entities valuing the proof of the plaintiff's
injuries in two equally fair ways.") A jury making the decision not to believe Mr. McCandless's
biased, and unsupported opinion, as to the value of his truck is not a reflection of "passion or
prejudice" but rather a reflection of a jury doing what it is supposed to do; i.e. making a
determination as to a witness's credibility and determining what testimony to believe, or disbelieve
the testimony of certain witnesses using the juries own everyday experiences to determine value.
Moreover, jurors are given the power to make determinations on matters that are within the
common knowledge, experience and understanding of laymen, and the value of a vehicle and
whether an owner of a vehicle is overvaluing their own vehicle, are matters within that scope of
common knowledge and understanding, and the jury was certainly able to make the determination
that a 2005 Dodge Ram should not be valued near $46,000 and instead reach a decision as to an
appropriate and proper valuation based on what they believe is fair and just.
Finally, the instructions given to the jury expressly instructed the jury to "determine which
of the witnesses you believe, what portion of their testimony you accept, and what weight you
attach to it." Instruction No. 2; see also I.D.J.I. 1.00). That instruction further specified that "[t]he
law does not, however, require you to accept all of the evidence that was admitted. In determining
what evidence you will acccept, you must make your own evaluation of the evidence and determine
the determine the degree of weight you choose to give to that evidence." Id. (emphasis added). As
such, the jury followed the instructions, the jury's determination should not be disturbed and it
certainly cannot "only" be described by unjust behavior, such as passion or prejudice, and therefore
the Court should deny Plaintiffs' Motion.
b. Medical/Health Bills
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In personal injury actions, juries are tasked with determining the amount of money that
"will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately
caused by the defendant's negligence." I.D.J.I. 9.01. As indicated above, when considering a jury's
award in the context of a motion for new trial, the Court must "refrain from substituting its view
for that of the jury, but is instructed to examine the disparity between its own judgment and that
of the jury and determine if it shocks the conscious of the Court." Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho
378, 3 P.3d 56 (Ct. App. 2000). When making that determination the Court must weigh the
evidence to reach its own determination as to a damage award and compare it with the jury's award,
and "[w]here the disparity is so great to suggest" the jury must have been acting under passion or
prejudice, the Court may decide to award a new trial. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625, 603
P .2d 575, 580 (1979). However, if the disparity is not of a nature that shocks the conscious of the
Court, it would not be likely to suggest an award based on passion or prejudice and therefore a
new trial should not be granted.
In this case, the jury's ultimate determination is supported by the evidence and there is
nothing sufficient to suggest that its determination must have been made based on passion or
prejudice. The jury made the determination, as to Dana McCandless, to only award him the amount
in medical expenses related to his ER visit immediately following the subject collision, although
he argued for an award ofhis total medical expenses claimed in the total amount of$7,355.41. The
amounts associated with that initial ER visit totaled $4,866.00 and the jury apparently made the
determination to round up to $4,900.00 for some additional compensation, but it appears that was
the intention, including the possibility of determining the "reasonable value" associated with that
initial ER visit along with the Kamiah Ambulance charges ($675 snd $4,191.00 respectively).
Furthermore, the total claimed by Ms. Blackeagle was in the amount of $10,366.20 for medical
expenses, with $8,114.00 claimed for her visit to the ER and imaging following the subject
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accident. The total amount she was ultimately awarded for special damages was $9,900. As such,
with regard to Ms. Blackeagle, the jury likely awarded most of her medical expenses, however as
the specific amounts awarded were not described the rounded number could also represent
something in the way of a lost wage award, albeit not likely very much. As the instruction on
economic damages included lost wages, and as the amount awarded on the Verdict Form was not
specified as to what specific amounts being awarded, the additional amount added to the award for
their medical expenses could have included an award of lost wages, to the extent the jury believed
some figure was appropriate.
More likely, however, was the jury determining that those amounts ($9,900 and $10,200)
represented the "reasonable value of necessary medical care received" and such award could
certainly have been reached based on the evidence. There is no law in Idaho indicating that the
"reasonable value" cannot be an even number. The jury determined that the reasonable amount to
compensate Mr. McCandless and Ms. Blackeagle, whether as an amount of medical expenses
alone at an amount the jury believed to be reasonable, or based on a combination of medical
expenses and lost wages, they jury reached a determination that $9,900 and $10,200 were the
appropriate amounts and reasonable value necessary to compensate Plaintiffs. The award should
not be disturbed on the basis that the jury awarded a precise figure without including any change,
it should only be disturbed if through the Court's own deliberation, it arrives at a figure that so
greatly differs from the jury's award so as to shock the conscience of the Court. As the specific
amounts awarded to arrive at the specific damage award that were ultimately awarded by the jury
were not parceled out, it must be accepted that the jury followed the instructions and awarded a
figure they believed would fairly and justly compensate the Plaintiffs for all the economic damages
claimed, excluding the property damage, which was specifically set aside in a separate
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interrogatory on the verdict form. Only if the Court's own determination differs from the jury's so
greatly so as to shock its conscience, should the jury's award be disturbed.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court should not determine that an award of
$9,900.00 to compensate Mr. McCandless for his personal injury claim "shocks the conscience of
the court" and should determine that the jury's decision was fair and just, does not represent a
situation where the jury "must" have reached its award as a result of passion or prejudice, and that
the jury reached its conclusion based on the instructions provided to it by the Court.
c. Lost Wages
Plaintiffs' allegations that they should be granted a new trial because there "were no lost
wages included" in the jury's verdict should be determined to be baseless because, again,
determinations as to damages are matters left to the jury and there was unquestionably sufficient
evidence in the record to demonstrate that the jury's decision was appropriate and supported.
Plaintiffs did not introduce documentation into the record that supported their lost wage claim.
They purported that some documentation existed and was in the possession of a woman who ran
the Farmer's Market in McCall, but those documents were never obtained/produced, and certainly
were not presented to the jury. Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that during the timeframe
Mr. Blackeagle claimed that she "lost wages" she was finishing obtaining her Bachelor's degree.
As such, she may not have been working at the time and there would be no valid basis for a wage
loss claim. There was more than sufficient evidence for the jury to reach the decision they arrived
at and there is no legitimate basis to argue the jury's determination should "shock the conscience
of the court".
There were numerous reasons advanced through the evidence by which the jury could have
discounted both the medical expenses and the wage claims based upon competent evidence. In the
first instance, if one looks at the medical treatment as argued at trial, other than the emergency
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room charges, the remainder was very minimal. Moreover, the records of the chiropractic
treatment, which was admitted into evidence, really did not reveal significant issues which the jury
could have totally discounted as emanating from the accident. There was also other evidence
indicating their activities continued essentially unabated after the accident. Ms. Blackeagle
continued on and laudably obtained her degree during this same time period in environmental
science. As set forth in the records of Dr. Mulnick, not that long after the accident in December of
2011, Plaintiffs were both building fence. The IME reports from Dr. McCormick do not reveal any
significant complaints throughout this entire time period. Moreover, as was pointed out, the
medical records from the emergency room did not reveal any objective type of injury. Hence, the
verdict awards with respect to the medical expenses are certainly based on competent evidence,
and Plaintiff has not presented any reason to question the verdict on those expenses which would
justify a new trial.
With respect to lost wages, there were substantial questions raised regarding any income
obtained from fishing upon which the jury could reasonably have concluded that lost wages were
minimal, or non-existent. There were no records presented regarding income lost as a result of lost
fishing opportunities. As Ms. Blackeagle testified, there was a person who ran the farmers market
in McCall where they sold their fish who kept some type of record.

Yet, and very tellingly,

neither Plaintiff made any effort to obtain any such record to support their claims and produce it
at trial.
Similarly, with respect to the roofing job claimed by Plaintiff McCandless, there was no
documentation or supporting or corroborating evidence offered by Plaintiffs to support any claim
for that loss. Rather, the jury could rightfully have concluded that the figure was drawn out of the
air. There was certainly no corroboration or real substantial evidence presented to justify the claim
for the lost roofing job.
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Also one thing that should not be forgotten in this analysis concern the issue of credibility.
Plaintiffs had their credibility called into question, most clearly concerning the "methadone"
conversation issue. This appeared to be a conversation that was created out of whole cloth and
presented for the first time at trial. Plaintiff Blackeagle testified to the supposed methadone issue,
when she had the clear opportunity to raise in her deposition taken some three years ago. However,
as was clearly demonstrated to the jury, this was brand new evidence which had yet never been
uncovered. Moreover, it made simply no sense based upon the testimony of Defendant Pease. As
he testified, he has been using methadone for years and has never had any issue with his ability to
drive, nor has there ever been a restriction placed upon his driver's license because of his use of
methadone. Hence, there were substantial questions of credibility with respect to the Plaintiffs,
and that issue needs to be considered in evaluating the jury's verdict and the evidence they relied
upon to reach that verdict.
d. Expert Witness
As to Plaintiffs' argument that the jury's verdict should be overturned as they were not
given an opportunity to cross-examine Defendant's medical expert, it must be emphasized that
plaintiffs themselves stipulated to the admissibility of the IME reports prepared by Defendant's
medical expert. As such, if plaintiffs intended to dispute the findings and/ or claim that defendants
expert needed to appear at trial so that the matters contained in the IME reports could be contested,
plaintiffs should not have stipulated to said reports. The fact they are doing so now simply reflects
they are dissatisfied with the jury's decision, and are attempting to find reasons that it should be
overturned, but the fact that Plaintiffs themselves stipulated to Dr. McCormick's IME Reports
demonstrates the arguments on this issue have no merit; Plaintiffs agreed the reports could be
admitted and raised no issue during the trial about the inability to cross-examine Dr. McCormick.
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It must be emphasized that in no way did Defendant prohibit Plaintiffs from deposing Dr.

McCormick and would have certainly allowed them to depose him in accordance with the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. It must be noted that plaintiffs take significant issue with Dr. McCormick
being an out of state expert, and that they were not permitted to depose her. There is no rule that
requires the defense to fly their expert into the state of Idaho, and there was also no prohibition on
plaintiffs deposing Dr. McCormick in her state of residence. Their failure to do so is not a failure
on the part the part of the defense. There is nothing that has been cited by plaintiff that is error, or
that the defense did that was contrary to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and plaintiffs failure
to conduct a deposition in a matter in accordance with the rules and/or to object to the admissibility
of the IME reports as opposed to stipulating to them is similarly not the fault of the defense. As
there is nothing that has been raised by plaintiffs that demonstrates error, or anything improper
either on the part of the defense, the court or the jury, this argument also lacks merit and further
demonstrates that Plaintiffs' Motion should be denied.
e. Other Arguments Raised by Plaintiffs
As to Plaintiffs' allegation under Rule 59(a)(l)(A) that there was some irregularity in the
proceedings, there is simply no merit to the claim. To Defendant's knowledge the pool of
prospective jurors were appropriately summoned from Nez Perce County and there is no legal
requirement that a party with Native American heritage have a Native American juror sitting on
the empaneled jury. A jury of citizens living in Nez Perce County, which would include Native
Americans living in the county, is a jury of Plaintiffs' peers and there is no legitimate basis to
argue to the contrary.
Plaintiffs offer some bizarre type of argument on page 3 of their Memorandum regarding
a supposed statement by defense counsel with respect to the mention of insurance.

Defense

counsel was extremely, based upon almost 35 years of practice, circumspect with respect to the
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issue of insurance, and has always been so in any trial. Hence, defense counsel went to great
lengths to make sure that all mentions of insurance were redacted from the exhibits that were
produced at trial. The statements on page 3 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum that defense counsel made
some statement of "we usually award two times the medical billings is a direct reference to
insurance by the defense" (sic) is a statement which defense counsel has never made, has never
ascribed to, and certainly did not make in this case. How this has anything to do with a motion for
a new trial is not explained in Plaintiffs' Memorandum. The remainder of Plaintiffs' argument
with respect to insurance, and the mention of insurance, and the fact that Mr. Pease was merely a
"prop" makes literally no sense, serves no purpose, and is quite frankly confusing.

Plaintiffs

mention at that same page that "this trial court should make a finding the current law of insurance
is unconstitutional" is an interesting proposition, with no citation to either evidence or law which
is competent.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, as well as those in the Affidavit of Counsel filed herewith
and based on the evidence admitted at trial and the trial proceedings in this matter, Plaintiffs'
Motion for New Trial should be denied and the jury's verdict in this matter should be upheld as
there is no legitimate basis for a new trial to be held on this matter.

DATED this 16th day of January, 2019.
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC

By_ _ _ _
/s_/_J._N_ic_k_C_r_a_w_fo_r_d_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
J. Nick Crawford, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant Max E. Pease
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of January , 2019, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered
by the method and to the addresses indicated below:
Robin D. Dunn
Dunn Law Offices
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, Idaho 83442
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com
Charles Murphy
420 W. Main Street
Suite 301
Boise, Idaho 83 702
boisescefile@geico.com

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 745-8160
E-File

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 319-3823
E-File

Isl J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Dana R McCandless, Mabel Robin Blackeagle
vs.
Max E Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle

Case No. CV-2013-1332

JUDGE: Brudie, Jeff M.

DATE: February 08, 2019

CLERK:JanetKough

LOCATION: Courtroom 1
COURT REPORTER: Linda Carlton

HEARING TYPE: Motion Hearing
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INTERPRETER:
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Max E Pease; Brent
Weddle; Charles Weddle
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John Nick Crawford; Charles Maurice Murphy;
Charles Maurice Murphy

Hearing Start Time: 10:01 AM
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- Attorneys are present by phone. Crt reviews case and motions filed by defense to alter or
amend the judgment and motion for costs. Objections have been filed by plaintiffs. Crt relays
Mr. McCandless and Ms. Blackeagle are present in court room.
10000 Mr. Dunn filed a motion for new trial also.
100343 Mr. Crawford will submit on briefs.
Crt reviews payments previously paid through subrogation.
100522 Mr. Dunn presents argument. Has concerns if prevailing party, no offer of judgment was
filed by the court. Briefing has been submitted.
100802 Mr. Crawford comments on offer of judgment, there was one served.
Mr. Dunn responds, might have been served but it was not filed.
100928 Crt takes next motions.
100944 Mr. Dunn presents argument on his motions to alter or amend judgment.
102050 Mr. Crawford presents argument in response.
102438 Mr. Dunn rebuttal argument.
102553 Crt comments. Crt takes motions under advisement. Crt will issue a written ruling.
Hearing End Time: 10:26 AM
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Filed: 03/28/2019 11:14:45
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Kough, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL,
R. BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife

)

CASE NO. CV13-1332

)

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
V.
)
)
)
MAX E. PEASE, and JOHN DOES 1-5,
)
)
)
)
Defendants.
________________)

OPINION AND ORDER ON
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial The Court heard
argument on this motion on February 8, 2019. The plaintiffs Dana McCandless and Mabel
Blackeagle were represented by Robin Dunn. The defendant Max Pease was represented by Nick
Crawford. The Court having read the motions and briefs of the parties, having heard arguments
of counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter originated as a personal injury lawsuit filed by Dana McCandless and Mable
Blackeagle on June 27, 2013. In their complaint the Plaintiffs alleged that on June 30, 2011 , The
Defendant negligently caused a motor vehicle accident which resulted in the Plaintiffs suffering
personal injury and economic damages. A trial was conducted on this matter December 17-19,
2018. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiffs, finding the

1
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1
Defendant to have been 75 percent negligent. The jury awarded damages in the amount of

$15,500 for the Plaintiffs' vehicle; $4,900 and $10,200 in monetary damages to McCandless and
Blackeagle respectively; and $5 ,000 and $1,000 in general damages to McCandless and
Blackeagle respectively. On January 2, 2019, The Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a new trial
pursuant to l.R.C.P. 59. The Plaintiffs assert in their motion that the jury could not have reached
the valuations of damages based on the evidence presented.
ANALYSIS
"The standard of review applicable to a district court's decision to grant or deny a new
trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) is abuse of discretion." Litke v. Munkho_ff; 163
Idaho 627, 632, 417 P.3d 224, 229 (2018).
A new trial is warranted where the jury's determination of damages appears to
have resulted from passion or prejudice. To determine whether damages are
excessive or inadequate, the district court must weigh the evidence and compare
the jury award with the award that it would have imposed. If the disparity is so
great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence
of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not to stand. [R]espect for the collective
wisdom of the jury and the function entrusted to it under our constitution suggests
the trial judge should, in most cases, accept the jury's findings even though [s]he
may have doubts about some of their conclusions.
[S]ince it is a jury function to set the damage award based on its sense of fairness
and justice, the trial judge must defer to the jury, unless it is apparent to the trial
judge that there is a great disparity between the two damage awards and that
disparity cannot be explained away as simply the product of two separate entities
valuing the proof of the plaintiffs injuries in two equally fair ways.
Finally, the court is not required to state the dollar amount it would have
awarded, but must weigh the evidence and determine the disparity between what
it would have awarded and the jury's award.

Id. at 633-34, 417 P.3d at 230- 31 (2018).
The Plaintiffs assert that the evidence they presented regarding damages was unrebutted
and therefore the jury could not have arrived at a different valuation based on the evidence
1

The jury found that a third party who had previously entered into a settlement agreement was 25 percent negligent.

2
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submitted. The Plaintiffs further request that this Court rule the current prohibition on the
mention of insurance is unconstitutional. Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that they were denied due
process when they were not allowed to subpoena the Defendant's expert Dr. McCormick.2

1. Damages
A. The Pickup Truck
The jury determined the valuation of the Plaintiffs damaged vehicle, a 2005 Dodge Ram,
to be $15,500. McCandless testified at trial that the total value of the truck was between $46,000
and $49,000, which he claimed represented the market value of the truck as well as aftermarket
add ons. These valuations however, were McCandless's own estimations of the value of his
vehicle. While The Defendant did not present evidence to the contrary, the jury as the finder of
fact, is not required to accept McCandless's valuation as correct.
The jury determined that the appropriate value of the vehicle was lower than
McCandless's testimony indicated. It is worth noting that the value ascertained by the jury was
reasonably close to the amount paid by the Defendant's insurer as a prepayment for the damage
to the vehicle. 3 In view of the evidence presented the Court does not find the disparity between
the jury's valuation and that which the Court may have reached to be so different that the Court
could determine it was influenced by passion or prejudice.

B. Medical Damages and Lost Wages
The Jury awarded damages for the Plaintiffs' medical expenses in the amount of $4,900
for McCandless and $10,200 for Blackeagle. The Plaintiffs take issue with the valuation reached
by the jury, asserting that the rounded numbers do not match any interpretation of the evidence.

2

Dr. McConnick performed an independent medical examination of the Plaintiffs.
' State Fann Insurance paid $1000 to the Plaintiffs' insurance company to cover their deductible, as well as an
additional $19,991.90 to the Plaintiffs for damage to the vehicle. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, at 2.
3

McCandless, et al. v. Pease.
Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial

Page 222

The Plaintiffs further assert that damages for lost wages were not considered entirely. The
verdict form, as agreed on by the parties, made no distinction between medical damages and loss
of wages but rather asked the jury to value monetary damages for actual expenses as a result of
the accident.
At trial , the Defendant did challenge the accuracy and validity of the Plaintiffs' total
claimed medical bills and lost wages. The Plaintiffs conclusory allegations to the contrary, the
jury had the evidence before them in reaching their decision. It is unclear what portion if any the
jury' s valuation of damages included the claimed medical bills or the claimed lost wages.
However, that was a decision for the jury to make. The fact that the jury award was "rounded" as
4
the Plaintiffs contend does not render it invalid or immediately suspect. This Court again does

not find such a disparity between the award of the jury and that which this Court may have
ordered, and therefore is unable to determine the award was influenced by passion or prejudice.
C. General Damages
The jury awarded general damages to McCandless in the amount of $5 ,000 and to
Blackeagle in the amount of$ I ,000. The Plaintiffs assert that the amounts awarded are "so
5
nominal as to shock the conscious of the court." While this Court does not find issue with the

award to McCandless, the significantly smaller award to Blackeagle is unusual. The evidence
presented at trial did not portray the driver, McCandless as suffering a proportionally greater
degree of general damages than the passenger, Blackeagle. Had this Court been the trier of fact,
it would have granted general damages in approximately equal amounts to McCandless and
Blackeagle. Accordingly, the Court finds the disparate award of$ I ,000 to Blackeagle appears to
be given under the influence of passion or prejudice.

4

5

Memorandum of The Plaintiffs in Support of New Trial, at 2.
Memorandum of The Plaintiffs, at 3.
4
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When cognizable grounds for a new trial have been established, the district court
has two options. The court may grant a new trial as requested or it may condition
the grant upon the nonmoving party's rejection of a suggested reduction in, or
addition to, the damages awarded, in conformity with the court's view of the
evidence. As is the case with an unconditional grant or denial of a new trial , the
nonbinding offer to modify a verdict by additur or remittitur will not be disturbed
on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown .. ..
It is implicit in the foregoing discussion that the judge may not peremptorily
modify an award over the objection of the party adversely affected. To do so
would be tantamount to entering a judgment n.o.v.-a disposition not subject to
the deferential review accorded to an exercise of discretion. However, the court
may suggest an adjustment in the damage award and order a new trial if the
suggestion is rejected.

Young v. Scott, 108 Idaho 506, 509-10, 700 P.2d 128, 131-32 (Ct. App. 1985)(intemal citations
omitted).
While the disparate award provides grounds for a new trial , this Court finds that the issue
can be better resolved through the granting of an additur. Therefore, the Court offers to order an
additur of $4,000 to Blackeagle' s general damages award. If the Defendant does not accept the
Court' s suggested additur, the Court will grant the motion for a new trial.
2. Rule on Insurance
The Plaintiffs ask for the Court to declare the law regarding the mention of insurance to
be unconstitutional. The Plaintiffs provide no rational argument to support such a finding but
6
wish to preserve the issue for a potential appeal. The Court finds no basis to make such a ruling

and further finds that if a change to this principle were to be made it should be made by Idaho ' s
Appellate Courts.
3. Expert Witness
The Plaintiffs allege they were denied due process when they were prevented by the
Defendants from subpoenaing Dr. McCormick, a designated expert witness for the defense, who

6

Memorandum of The Plaintiffs, at 3.

5
McCandless, el al. v. Pease.
Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial

Page 224

7
conducted an independen t medical examination on the Plaintiffs. Dr. McCormic k was listed as a

potential witness by the defense, however, at trial counsel for the Defendant determined
McCormic k ' s testimony was not needed and did not call her, after her written report was
admitted during the Plaintiffs' case.
Here, the Plaintiffs contend that they should have been permitted to arrange for Dr.
McCormic k's live testimony. As an expert retained by the Defendant, I.R.C.P. 26(4)(A)(v)
prevented the Plaintiffs from contacting Dr. McCormick without the Defendant 's permission.
The Plaintiffs stipulated to the admission of Dr. McCormic k's reports and the Defendant was
under no obligation to call Dr. McCormic k to the stand. If the Plaintiffs wished to rebut the
report of Dr. McCormick they were capable of hiring similar experts to offer contrasting
opinions. The Plaintiffs present no case law in support of their assertions, nor do they adequately
show how the absence of a defense witness fundamentally impacted their due process rights.
Accordingly, The Plaintiffs fail to show error in their inability to call Dr. McCormick.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial is conditionally
GRANTED , subject to the refusal by the Defendant of the proposed additur. If the Defendant
should agree to the proposed additur, the Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED. The Defendant shall
prepare an appropriate Amended Judgment, which should not include any amount for the
vehicle, as those damages are fully paid.

27 day of March 2019.
Dated this ___

Signed: 3/27/2019 03:17 PM

7

Mem orandum of The Plaintiffs, at 4.
6
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL was:
Signed: 3/28/2019 11:15 AM

E-Mailed by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this _ _ _ _ _ , to:
Robin Dunn: rdunn(q)dunnlawoffice.com

John Crawford: jnc@brassey.net

PA TTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK

By:g&
Deputy
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Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty Weeks, Clerk of the Court
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J. Nick Crawford, ISB 3220
Ryan C. Janis, ISB 9601
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345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 215
P.O. Box 1009
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Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DANA R. McCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 13-01332
Plaintiffs,
NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE OF
ADDITUR

vs.
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES
1-5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the above captioned Defendant, Max Pease, and in accordance with this
Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial and hereby gives notice of
acceptance of the additur of $4,000 to the Judgment in favor of Plaintiff Mabel Robin Blackeagle.
Defendant will submit an additional proposed judgment in accordance with the Court's
Memorandum.

NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE OF ADDITUR - 1

Page 227

DATED this 1st day of April , 2019.
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC

By
Isl J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant Max E. Pease

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of April , 2019, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Robin D. Dunn
Dunn Law Offices
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, Idaho 83442
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com
Charles Murphy
420 W. Main Street
Suite 301
Boise, Idaho 83 702
boisescefile@geico.com

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 745-8160
E-File

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 319-3823
E-File

Isl J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford

NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE OF ADDITUR - 2
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Electronically Filed
4/3/2019 1:42 PM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Brittany Davenport, Deputy Clerk

DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. 0. Box277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (t)
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PEARCE

DANA R MCCANDLESS and MABEL,
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants)
vs.
)
)
MAX E. PEASE,
)
)
)
Defendant/Respondent.
)
_____________)

Case No. CV-2013-01332
NOTICE OF APPEAL

I.A.R. 11, 17

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT; AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants appeal against the above-named Respondent to

the Idaho Supreme Court, from the "Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial:" along
with the First Amended Judgment in this matter. The decision of the court was dated
March 28, 2019. The First Amended Judgment has just been e-filed and not yet dated. The
presiding district judge was Hon. JeffM. Brudie.
2.

The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Supreme Court from the district

Court in Nez Pearce County concerning the decision on the request for new trial, and the
judgment/order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant
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to Rule ll(a) I.A.R., as follows: (1) Final judgments, as defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure including judgments of the court granting or denying peremptory
writs of mandate and prohibition;
The appellants are represented by Robin D. Dunn, Esq. #2903,
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com P.O. Box 277, Rigby, Idaho 83442, 208.745-9202; The
respondents are represented by John Crawford, Esq. #3220, jnc@brassey.net P.O. Box 1009,
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009, 208.344-7300.

3.

The issue(s) on appeal include, but are not limited, to the following:
a.

The court did not apply the facts of the trial to the impossible outcome

in the special verdict.
b.

The judge's ruling included an additur which was not requested by the

appellant.
c.

The judge did not consider, adequately, the denial of due process

rights of the appellants and the desire to call to the stand the IME medical
expert doctor hired by the respondent.
d.

The jury award was made due to passion or prejudice as the special

verdict bears out.
e.

The inability to discuss the history of the insurance payments made to

various parties is unconstitutional and does not bear the truth to the jury and
is misleading and prejudicial as the same is a fiction.
f.

The additur of the district court cannot correct the errors of the jury in

formulating the proper award to the appellants.

g.
NOTICE OF APPEAL

The respondent presented no defense to damages and the jury could
-2-
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not totally disregard the unrebutted testimony of the appellants or witnesses.

4.

A clerk's record is requested on all post-trial pleadings along with the

complaint and answer. No other pleadings are requested. A copy of the repository on file in
this matter is requested.
5.

The Appellant requests that the following documents be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those antomatically inclnded under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
-The repository of the case.
-The minute entry.
-The court's post-trial rulings.
- All pleadings and declarations, post-trial, in the court file since the
order on new trial.
6.

The undersigned certifies:
a,

That the Appellant has made or will make contact with the clerk of the

district court and are in the process of obtaining the estimated fee for preparation of the
clerk's record.
b.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record will be paid

upon determination by the clerk.
c.

That appellate filing fee has been paid;

d.

A transcript of the trial is requested and will be paid as determined by

the short-hand reporter. (Linda Carlton).
e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. by the e-filing system of i-court.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

-3-
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DATED this 3•• day of April, 2019.

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3•• day of April, 2019 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was delivered via thee-filing system ofi-court to the following persons(s)/entity
by:
DOCUMENT SERVED:

Notice of Appeal

ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED:
District Judge Chambers in Lewiston, Idaho
John Crawford, Esq. jnc@brassey.net
Charles Murphy, Esq. boisescefile@geico.com

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

NOTICE OF APPEAL

-4-
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Filed: 03/28/2019 11 :14:45
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Kough, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL,
R. BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife

)

CASE NO. CV13-1332

)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)

v.

OPINION AND ORDER ON
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

)

)
MAX E. PEASE, and JOHN DOES 1-5,

)

)
)
)

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial The Cotut heard
argument on this motion on February 8, 2019. The plaintiffs Dana McCandless and Mabel
Blackeagle were represented by Robin Dunn. The defendant Max Pease was represented by Nick
Crawford. The Couti having read the motions and briefs of the parties, having heard arguments
of counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter originated as a personal injury lawsuit filed by Dana McCandless and Mable
Blackeagle on June 27, 2013. In their complaint d1eP!aintiffs alleged that on June 30, 2011, The
Defendant negligently caused a motor vehicle accident which resulted in the Plaintiff.~ suffering
personal injury and economic damages. A trial was conducted on this matter December 17-19,
2018. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiffs, finding the

i
lvlcCand/ess, el al, v. Pease.
Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial
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Defendant to have been 75 percent negligent. 1 The jury awarded damages in the amount of
$15,500 for the Plaintiffs' vehicle: $4,900 and $] 0,200 in monetary damages to McCandless and
Blackeagle respectively; and $5,000 and $1,000 in general damages to McCandless and
Blackeagle respectively. On January 2, 2019, The Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a new trial
pursuanl to LR.C.l'. 59. The Plaintiffs assert in their motion that the jury could not have reached
the valuations of damages based on the evidence presented.

ANALYSIS
"The standard of review applicable to a district court's decision to grant or deny a new
trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) is abuse of discretion." Litke v. Munkhof]; 163
Idaho 627. 632, 417 P.3d 224, 229 (2018).
A new trial is warranted where the jury's determination of damages appears to
have resulted from passion or prejudice. To determine whether damages are
excessive or inadequate, the district court mus! weigh the evidence and compare
the jury award with the award that it would have imposed. lfthe disparity is so
great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence
of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not to stand. [R]espect for the collective
wisdom of the jury and the function entrusted to it under our constitution suggests
the h'ial judge should, in most cases, accept the jury's findings even though [s]he
may have doubts about some of their conclusions.

[S]ince it is a jury function to sel the damage award based on its sense of fairness
and justice, the trial judge must defer to the jury, unless it is apparent to the trial
judge that there is a great disparity between the two damage awards and that
disparity cannot be explained away as simply the product of two separate entities
valuing the proof of the plaintiffs injuries in two equally fair ways.
Finally, the court is not required to state the dollar amount it would have
awarded, but must weigh the evidence and determine the disparity between what
it would have awarded and the jury's award.
Id. at 633-34, 417 P.3d at 230-31 (2018).

The Plaintiffs assert that the evidence they presented regarding damages was umebutted
and therefore the jury could not have arrived at a different valuation based on the evidence
1

The jury found that a third party who had previously entered into a settlement agreement was 25 percent negligent.
2
lv/cCandless, el al. v. Pease.
Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial
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submitted. The Plaintiffs further request that this Court rule the current prohibition on the
mention of insurance is unconstitutional. Finally. the Plaintiffs assert that they were denied due
process when they were not allowed to subpoena the Defendant's expert Dr. McConnick. 2

l. Damages
A. The Pickup Truck

The jury determined the valuation of the Plaintiffs damaged vehicle, a 2005 Dodge Ram,
to be $15,500, McCandless testified at trial that the total value of the truck was between $46,000
and $49,000, which he claimed represented the market value of the truck as well as aftennarket
add ans. These valuations however, were McCandless's own estimations of the value ofhis
vehicle. While The Defendant did not present evidence to the contrary, the jury as the finder of
fact, is not required to accept McCandless's valuation as correct.
The jury determined that the appropriate value of the vehicle was lower than
McCandless's testimony indicated, It is worth noting that the value ascertained by the jury was
reasonably close lo the amount paid by the Defendant's insurer as a prepayment for the damage
to the vehicle:' In view of the evidence presented the Court does not find the disparity between
the jury's valuation and that which the Court may have reached to be so different that the Court
could determine it was influenced by passion or prejudice.
B. Medical Damages and Lost Wages ·

The Jury awarded damages for the Plaintiffs' medical expenses in the amount of$4,900
for McCandless and $10,200 for Blackeagle. The Plaintifts take issue with the valuation reached

by the jury. asserting that the rounded numbers do not match any interpretation of the evidence.

'Dr. McConnick performed an independent medical exam[nation oflhe Plaintiffs.
'State Farm Insurance paid$ IOOO to the Plaintiffs' insurance company to cover their deductible. as well as an
additional $19.991.90 to the Plaintiffs for damage to the vehicle. See Memoranc/11111 in Sappor/ <!f D~fe11d11nl 's
Molion to Aller or Amend .Judgment, at 2.
3

A1cCa11dless. el al. v. Pease.
Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial
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The Plaintil'fa further asse11 that damages for lost wages were not considered entirely. The
verdict form. as agreed on by the parties, made no distinction between medical damages and loss
of wages but rather asked the jury to value monetary damages for actual expenses as a result of
the accident.
At trial, the Defendant did challenge the accuracy and validity of the Plaintiffs' total
claimed medical bills and lost wages. The Plaintiffs conclusory allegations to the contrary, the
jury had the evidence before them in reaching their decision. ft is unclear what pmiion if any the
jury·s valuation of damages included the claimed medical bills or the claimed lost wages.
However, that was a decision for the jury to make. The fact that the jury award was "munded" as
the Plaintiff.~ contend does 1101 render it invalid or immediately suspect.'' This Court again does
not find such a disparity between the award of the jury and that which this Court may have
ordered, and therefore is unable to determine the award was influenced by passion or prejudice.
C. General Damages

The jury awarded general damages to McCandless in the amount of $5,000 and to
Blackeagle in the amount of $1,000. The Plaintiffs assert that the amounts awarded are "so
nominal as to shock the conscious of the court." 5 While this Court does not find issue with the
award to McCandless, the significantly smaller award to Blackeagle is unusual. The evidence
presented at trial did not portray the driver, McCandless as suffering a proportionally greater
degree of general damages than the passenger, Blackeagle. Had this Cornt been the trier of fact.
it would have granted general damages in approximately equal amounts to McCa11dless and
Blackeagle. Accordingly, the Court finds the disrarate award of$1,000 to Blackeagle appears to
be given under the influence of passion or prejudice.

1
•

~

Memoram/um of11w Plaint(/]~ in SuppoN of New 'l)•fr1/, at 2,
Memorwulum <f11,e Naintj/fa'. at 3.
4

McCandless, el al. 1·. Pease.
Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial
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When cognizable grounds for a new trial have been established, the district court
has two options. The court may grant a new trial as requested or it may condition
the grant upon the nonmoving party's rejection of a suggested reduction in, or
addition to, the damages awarded. in conformity \Vith the court's view of the
evidence. As is the case with an unconditional grant or denial of a new trial. the
nonbinding offer to modify a verdict by additur or rcmittitur will not be disturbed
on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is ~hown ....
It is implicit in the foregoing discussion that the judge may not peremptorily

modify an award over the objection ofthepaiiy adversely affected. To do so
would be tantamount to entering a judgment n.o.v.-a disposition not sul\ject to
the deferential review accorded to an exercise of discretion. However, the court
may suggest an adjustment in the damage award and order a new trial if the
suggestion is rejected.
Young "· Scott, l 08 Idaho 506. 509-10, 700 P.2d 128, 13 I•32 (Ct. App. l 985)(internal citations

omitted).
While the disparate award provides grounds for a new trial, this Court finds that the issue
can be better resolved through the granting of an additur. Therefore, the Comt offers to order an
additur of$4,000 to Blackeagle's general damages award. If the Defendant does not accept the
Comt's suggested additnr, the Court will grant the motion for a new trial.
2. Rule on Insurance

The Plaintiffs ask for the Court to dcclarelhe law regarding the mention of insurance to
he unconstitutional. The Plaintiffs provide no rational argument to support such a finding but
wish to preserve the issue for a potential appeal. 6 The Court linds 110 basis to make such a ruling
and ft11ther linds that if a change to this principle were to be made it should be made by Idaho ·s
Appellate Courts.
3. Expert Witness

The Plaintiffs allege they were denied due process when they were prevented by the
Defendants from subpoenaing Dr. McCormick, a designated expert witness for the defense, who

1
'

Ml'mora11d11m fd°The Plaint!{li at 3.
5

:\ le( 'andlt!ss. et al. , .. Pease,
Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial
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conducted an independent medical examination 01J the Plaintiffs. 7 Dr. McC01111ick was listed as a
potential witness by the defense, however, at trial counsel for the Defendant determined
McCormick's testimony was not needed and did not call her, after her written report was
admitted during the Plaintiffs' case.
Here, the Plaintiffs contend that they should have been permitted lo arrange for Dr.
McCormick's live testimony. As an expert retained by the Defendant, l.R.C.P. 26(4)(A)(v)
prevented the Plaintiffs from contacting Dr. McCormick without the Defendant's pennission.
The Plaintiffs stipulated 10 the admission of Dr. McCormick's reports and the Defendant was
under no obligation to call Dr. McCormick to the stand. If the Plaintiffs wished lo rebut the
report of Dr. McCormick they were capable of hiring similar experts to offer contrasting
opinions. The Plaintiffs present no case law in support of their assertions, nor do they adequately
show how the absence of a defense witness fundamentally impacted their due process rights.
Accordingly, The Plaintiffs fail to show error in their inahilily to call Dr. McC01111ick.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial is conditionally
GRANTED, subject to the refusal by the Defendant of the proposed additur. lfthe Defendant
should agree to the proposed additur, the Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED. The Defendant shall
prepare an appropriate Amended Judgment, which should not include any amount for the
vehicle. as those damages are fully paid.

27

Dated this

day of March 2019.

Signed: 3127/2019 03:17 PM

.TE

7

Memorandum of'/1,e Pfo;ntt{P,·, at 4.

6
,HcCandless, et al. v. Pease.
Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL was:
Signed: 3/28/2019 11:15 AM

E-Mailed by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this _ _ _ _ _ . to:
Robin Dunn: rdunn{ii)dunnlawotlice.eom

John Crawford: jnc@brassev.net

PA TTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK

Hy:

Ji&

Deputy

7
AfcCandles.v. el a{. v, Pease.

Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial
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Filed: 04/05/2019 11:19:52
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Kough, Janet

J. Nick Crawford, ISB 3220
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 215
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Attorneys for Defendant Max E. Pease

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DANA R. McCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and
wife,
Case No. CV 13-01332
Plaintiffs,
AMENDED JUDGMENT

vs.
MAX E. PEASE, BRENT WEDDLE,
CHARLES WEDDLE, and JOHN DOES
1-5,
Defendants.

This matter having come on for trial and the jury having rendered its verdict, Judgment is
rendered as follows:
1.

Max Pease is 75% negligent and Brent Weddle is 25% negligent.

2.

Actual expenses to Plaintiffs are $4,900 to Dana McCandless and $10,200 to Robin

Blackeagle.
3.

General damages to Plaintiffs are $5,000 to Dana McCandless and $5,000 to Robin

Blackeagle.

AMENDEDJUDGMENT-1
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4.

Total damages to Plaintiffs are $25,100, minus 25% for fault attributable to Brent

Weddle.
5.

Judgment is rendered in favor of Plaintiff Dana R. McCandless in the amount of$7,425;

to Plaintiff Mabel Robin Blackeagle in the amount of $11,400.
DATED:

Signed: 4/4/2019 03:27 PM

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 4/5/2019 11:20 AM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Robin D. Dunn
Dunn Law Offices
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, Idaho 83442
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com
Charles Murphy
420 W. Main Street
Suite 301
Boise, Idaho 83 702
boisescefile@geico.com

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 745-8160
E-File

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 319-3823
E-File

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 344-7077
E-File

J. Nick Crawford
Brassey Crawford, PLLC
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009

Deputy Clerk

AMENDEDJUDGMENT-2
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Filed: 04/16/2019 13:03:07
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Kough, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL,
R. BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife
Plaintiffs,

V.

MAX E. PEASE, and JOHN DOES 1-5,

Defendants.

)

CASE NO. CV13-1332

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT

_____ _____ _____ _

JUDGMENT IS RENDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Max Pease is 75% negligent and Brent Weddle is 25% negligent.

2. Actual expenses to Plaintiffs are $4,900 to Dana McCandless and $10,200 to Robin
Blackeagle.
3. General damages to Plaintiffs are $5,000 to Dana McCandless and $5,000 to Robin
Blackeagle.
4. Total damages to Plaintiffs are $25,100, minus 25% for fault attributable to Brent
Weddle.
5. Judgment is rendered in favor of Plaintiff Dana R. McCandless in the amount of $7,425;
to Plaintiff Mabel Robin Blackeagle in the amount of$11,400.

1
McCandless, et al. v. Pease
Second Amended Judgment
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4/16/2019 12:14 PM
Dated this -Signed:
-------

.iifFM. BRUDIE, District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT was:
Signed: 4/16/2019 01:03 PM

E-mailed by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this _ _ _ _ _ _ _ to:

J. Nick Crawford: jnc@brassey.net
Charles M. Murphy: boisescefile@geico.com
Robin Dunn: rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com

PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK

Deputy

2
McCandless, et al. v. Pease
Second Amended Judgment
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Electronically Filed
4/18/2019 4:14 PM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Diane Ash, Deputy Clerk

DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. 0. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PEARCE

DANA R MCCANDLESS and MABEL,
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs/Appellants)
vs.
)
)
MAX E. PEASE,
)
)
)
Defendant/Respondent.
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-01332
AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

I.A.R. 11, 17

_____________

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT; AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants appeal against the above-named Respondent to

the Idaho Supreme Court, from the "Opinion and Order on Motion for New Trial:" along
with the Judgment dated January 4, 2019. The decision of the court was dated March 28,
2019. The Amended Judgment was dated April 5, 2019; and the court's Second Amended
Judgment was dated April 15, 2019. The presiding district judge was Hon. Jeff M. Brodie.
2.

The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Supreme Court from the district

Court in Nez Pearce County concerning the decision on the request for new trial, and the
judgment/ order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant
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to Rule 11(a) I.A.R., as follows: (1) Final judgments, as defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure including judgments of the court granting or denying peremptory
writs of mandate and prohibition;
The appellants are represented by Robin D. Dunn, Esq. #2903,
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com P.O. Box 277, Rigby, Idaho 83442, 208.745-9202; The
respondents are represented by John Crawford, Esq. #3220, jnc@brassey.net P.O. Box 1009,
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009, 208.344-7300.

3.

The issue(s) on appeal include, but are not limited, to the following:
a.

The court did not apply the facts of the trial to the impossible outcome

in the special verdict.
b.

The judge's ruling included an additur which was not requested by the

appellant.
c.

The judge did not consider, adequately, the denial of due process

rights of the appellants and the desire to call to the stand the IME medical
expert doctor hired by the respondent.
d.

The jury award was made due to passion or prejudice as the special

verdict bears out.
e.

The inability to discuss the history of the insurance payments made to

various parties is unconstitutional and does not bear the truth to the jury and
is misleading and prejudicial as the same is a fiction.
f.

The additur of the district court cannot correct the errors of the jury in

formulating the proper award to the appellants.
g.

The respondent presented no defense to damages and the jury could
2
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not totally disregard the unrebutted testimony of the appellants or witnesses.

4.

A clerk's record is requested on all post-trial pleadings along with the

complaint and answer. No other pleadings are requested. A copy of the repository on file in
this matter is requested.
5.

The Appellant requests that the following documents be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
-The repository of the cas_e,
-The minute entry.
-The court's post-trial rulings.
- All pleadings and declarations, post-trial, in the court file since the
order on new trial.
6.

The undersigned certifies:
a.

That the Appellant has made or will make contact with the clerk of the

district court and are in the process of obtaining the estimated fee for preparation of the
clerk's record.
b.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record will be paid

upon determination by the clerk.
c.

That appellate filing fee has been paid;

d.

A transcript of the trial is requested and will be paid as determined by

the short-hand reporter. (Linda Carlton).
e,

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. by the e-filing system of i-court.
3
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DATED tlti, 18" &yofAp"' 2019

0

~

61

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of April, 2019 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was delivered via the e-filing system of i-court to the following
persons(s)/entity by:
DOCUMENT SERVED:

Notice of Appeal

ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED:
District Judge Chambers in Lewiston, Idaho
John Crawford, Esq. jnc@brassey.net
Charles Murphy, Esq. boisescefile@geico.com

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

4
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Electronically Filed
4/29/2019 7:27 AM
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Diane Ash, Deputy Clerk

J. Nick Crawford, ISB 3220
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court St. 215
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: 208-433-7300
Facsimile: 208-344-7077
Email address: jnc@brassey.net

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE COUNTY

DANA R MCCANDLESS and MABEL,
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Nez Perce County District Court
Case No. CV-2013-01332
Docket No. 46936-2019
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD

vs.
MAX E. PEASE,

I.A.R. 19
Defendant/Respondent.
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED APPELLANTS; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED
COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Respondent in the above entitled proceeding hereby requests pursuant
to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the reporter's record and the
clerk's record in addition to that requested by Appellants, that material required to be
included by the I.A.R., and the Notice of Appeal:
a. Reporter's Record:
1.

Trial transcript, to include opening and closing statements, all testimony
by witnesses, both direct examination and cross examination; as well as all
hearings with the court; as well as the verdict.
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ii. Jury instructions verbally given by the court.
b. Clerk's Record:
1.

11.

111.

All written requested jury instructions.
All written jury instructions given by the court.
All briefs relating to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial including Statements
and Affidavits considered by the court on the Motion for New Trial.

2. I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcript record has been served on the
court reporter of whom a transcript is requested; (Linda Carlton). The preparation fee will
be paid as determined by the reporter.
3. I certify that a copy of this request for additional records has been served upon the clerk
of the district court. The preparation fee will be paid as determined by the clerk of the
district court.
4. I certify that all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. have been
served.

DATED THIS 29TH day of April, 2019.
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC
By /s/ J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford, Of the Firm.
Attorney for the Respondent Max Pease
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of April , 2019, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Robin D. Dunn
Dunn Law Offices
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, Idaho 83442
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 745-8160
E-File

/s/ J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford
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TO: Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
Fax (208) 334-2616
supremecourtdocuments@idcourts.net

Filed: 05/09/2019 14:29:30
Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County
Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Davenport, Brittany

RE: Docket No. 46936-2019
McCandless V Pease
Nez Perce County Case No. CV 13-1332

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on May 9, 2019, I lodged a transcript of 315 pages in length
for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of Nez Perce
in the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho.
Included Motions Hearing:
Jury Trial December 17, 18 & 19, 2018

An electronic copy was downloaded to Odyssey.

_________________________________________
Linda L. Carlton, CSR #336
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife,

Supreme Court Case No. 46936-2019

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

MAX E. PEASE,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
BRENT WEDDLE, CHARLES WEDDLE,
and JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
I, Brittany Davenport, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the attached list of
exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forwarded to the Supreme Court on
Appeal. It should be noted, that all original exhibits will be retained at the district court clerk's
office and will be made available for viewing upon request. Digital images of photos and
documents have been provided.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

29th
_ _ day of _ _May
_ _ _ _ _ _ , 2019.
Court on this the _
PATTY WEEKS
Clerk of the Court
Signed: 5/29/2019 02:36 PM

By·
~~
oePuty Clerk

Certificate of Exhibits - D (MISC28)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to :
Robin Dwain Dunn
PO Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

[X] By Mail

John Nick Crawford
PO Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009

[X] By Mail

Patty Weeks
Clerk of the Court
Signed: 5/29/2019 02:35 PM

Dated: - - - - - -

Certificate of Exhibits - D (MISC28)
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Exhibit Log
Case: CV-2013-1332

Case Style:

Exhibit ID
Exhibit#

On Behalf Of
Source

Status
Date

Plaintiff's
Exhibit
10
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
11
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
12
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
13
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
14
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
16
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
17
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
18
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
18A

Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain

Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018

Total Count:

15

Proj.
Return/

Dana R McCandless, Mabel Robin Blackeagle
vs.
Max E Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle

Type
Description

Exhibit Flag

Sort Order: Exhibit #

Custody
Date

Custody Detail

Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018

Document
Chiropractic Records Blackeagle
Document
Chiropractic bill McCandless
Document
Chiropractic bill Blackeagle
Document
IME Report - McCandless

Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018

Document
IME Report - Blackeagle

03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room

Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018

Document
summary of health care
expenses - Blackeagle
Document
medical bills McCandless
Document
billing records Blackeagle
Document
billing from Orofino
Wellness Center
-EXCLUDED BY COURT

03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room

Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018
Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018

Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018
Exhibit Admitted
12/17/2018
Exhibit
Denied/Not
Admitted
12/17/2018

03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room
03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room
03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room
03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room

03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room
03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room
03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room
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Exhibit Log
Case: CV-2013-1332

Case Style:

On Behalf Of
Source

Status
Date

Plaintiff's
Exhibit
19
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
20
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
4
Plantiff's
Exhibit
7
State's
Exhibit
8
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
9

Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain
Plaintiff
Dunn, Robin
Dwain

Exhibit Admitted
12/17/2018

Photograph
30 photos

03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room

Exhibit Admitted
12/17/2018

Photograph
18 photos

03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room

Exhibit Admitted
12/17/2018

Document
ISP Driver statement Max Pease
Document
title & registration - 2005
Dodge
Document
Drawing on easel paper
illustrative purposes
Document
Chiropractic Records McCandless

03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room

Total Count:

15

Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018
Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018

Type
Description

Exhibit Flag

Sort Order: Exhibit #

Exhibit ID
Exhibit#

Exhibit Admitted
12/18/2018

Proj.
Return/

Dana R McCandless, Mabel Robin Blackeagle
vs.
Max E Pease, Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle

Custody
Date

Custody Detail

03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room
03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room
03/21/2019 Nez Perce County District Court:
Exhibit Room

Page
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DANA R. MCCANDLESS and MABEL
ROBIN BLACKEAGLE, husband and wife,

Supreme Court Case No. 46936-2019

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

MAX E. PEASE,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
BRENT WEDDLE, CHARLES WEDDLE,
and JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
I, Brittany Davenport, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District, of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is
a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript,
along with copies of all Exhibits offered or admitted to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties
in this case as follows:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

5/29/2019
I certify that on _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ , I served a copy of the attached to:
Robin Dwain Dunn
PO Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

[X] By Mail

John Nick Crawford
PO Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009

[X] By Mail

Signed: 5/29/2019 02:32 PM

Dated: - - - - - -

Patty Weeks
Clerk of the Court

Clerk's Certificate of Service - Revised 07/01/2018
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